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THE SPIRITUAL ASCENT OF MAN

BY

W. TUDOR JONES, D.PHIL.


WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

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INTRODUCTION

(BY THE MASTER OF BALLIOL)

THIS book aims at bringing the best philosophical thought of the time within the range of the ordinary reader. It is an undertaking likely to be all the more useful, as the ordinary Englishman is not a philosopher; with him, as with Dr. Johnson's friend, "cheerfulness will keep breaking in." This cheerfulness is doing noble service to the nation to-day in the trenches and in the workshops. But it is itself based on an inarticulate philosophy, and there is danger in our English foible of being too proud to be articulate. For the present is a time which is stirring men to think, and to think hard, who never thought before. Out of this stirring, if properly guided, great things should come—a better Europe for the na-

tions to share in, and a better England for our children to live in. Such guidance is being daily proffered by many—by preachers, by social reformers, by historians, and by international lawyers. But not many of the philosophers have come forward, and, when they do, philosophers seem to the average man to write in a jargon of their own. This book, though written by a deeply read student of philosophy, will be found intelligible, and even agreeably readable. Its message is one of hope, or rather of confidence and conviction, and it is expressed in such a spirit that must leave the reader with a very friendly feeling towards the author.

The first chapters approach the problem from the standpoint of modern science; the rest of the book attempts to advance through psychology to ethics and to religion. This part will require more effort in the reader, but the sort of effort that is both educational and inspiring. He will be rewarded, moreover, in his journey by lighting on many fine thoughts well expressed,

such as these: "How to create interest in the masses for the things of the Spirit is the great problem of to-day." . . . "There is no limit to the possibility of spiritual development." . . . "The ideal is always close at hand, and the only way to progress is through human social relations." . . . "The union of the human and the Divine is possible; this is the essence of Christianity." . . . "Every man, however much he would deprecate the charge of being a philosopher, has felt that there must be meaning in the universe: that is, there must be mind, or else it would be not a universe but a chaos." . . . "That life cannot be reduced to matter, that the body must be a means to the development of the soul, that the so-called conflict of religion and science can only be a transient phase, that, in the words of a famous psychologist, 'This world, with all that lies within it, is a spiritual world,' that the conception of a God is something to which thought and life lead up as a fact."

Here he will find these convictions set

upon a logical ground, correlated with experience and with knowledge, and set in their due place in the new spiritual movement which many forces are now converging to produce, and which alone can recompense the world for the present war.

A. L. SMITH.

OXFORD,

November 1, 1916.

PREFACE

My object in this volume has been to present some of the main problems of science, philosophy, and religion as these are dealt with by a number of the most prominent writers of our day. It is no longer possible to keep science, philosophy, and theology in different compartments, and probably the greatest weakness of the Church in the past has been the failure to give due heed to the various branches of knowledge in their bearings on religion. A religious synthesis which is obtained at the expense of the conclusions of these various branches is without a doubt destined more and more in the future to be of less and less avail and finally to pass away. The time has arrived for a reconstruction of religion on its intellectual side, and the signs of the coming of such a synthesis are already in our midst. This volume will have served its purpose if it satisfies, in some degree, the

pressing need for a fresh consideration of the problem of religion, if it succeeds in setting forth the chief features of the religion of the future, and, above all, if it guides to a safe spiritual anchorage those who are ceaselessly tossed about on the tempestuous sea of knowledge. That such an anchorage is needed by our young people to-day no one can deny, and that it is all-important in the conduct of life all will agree. This has been at least my aim—to show how the various branches of human knowledge if carried far enough, and brought into direct relationship with life, are subsidiary stages to Religion in general and to Christianity in particular.

I wish to thank my wife, also my friend, Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, for several valuable suggestions and for much kind help in the reading of proofs.

W. TUDOR JONES.

CLIFTON, BRISTOL,
October 20, 1916.

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THE SPIRITUAL
ASCENT OF MAN

The Spiritual Ascent of Man

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF SCIENCE

WE are living, at the present moment, in the very mid-stream of the most colossal struggle the world has ever seen. Throughout the preceding fifty years, in every civilised state, the arts and the sciences, the social and economic conditions of life, the spread of all the branches of human knowledge, had passed through a period of uninterrupted development. This period has been one of the most remarkable in the whole history of mankind. All the old foundations have

been critically examined in the light of modern science, and have had to be reconstructed and revised in order to meet the new demands made upon them by the widening progress of human thought. Within a single generation our conceptions of the universe, man, and religion have suffered fundamental changes—changes which can never again give place to the old conceptions which had hitherto prevailed. This truth, within the domain of natural science, has passed from the realm of controversy to the realm of certainty. And even within the domains of philosophy and religion all the problems of life and the universe have undergone changes quite as important as have occurred within natural science. And though the process here is not so tangible, this is simply because it deals with material which largely arises from thought and not from the things of the external world. To take a leading representative of the religious thought of this generation—Rudolf Eucken—the fact of the enormous changes just

referred to is clearly seen.¹ Many writers on philosophy and religion show very clearly how two courses of thought have been in antagonism to each other during the last and the present centuries. Natural science and traditional theology have failed to come to an understanding with each other, and to-day the breach has so widened that practically all the leaders of modern religious thought have at last become conscious of the fact. They feel it is entirely hopeless to affirm that a thing must be so because it has been so during no matter how long a past. The all-important verifications of the claims of science are now so self-evident that it is simply futile for any person to attempt to contradict them in their basal principles and far-reaching results.

If, further, we look at any object of History, we are there confronted with the same conditions as within the province of science. The historical conceptions of traditional theo-

¹ Cf. *The Truth of Religion*, by Rudolf Eucken (Eng. trans., 2nd ed., pp. 24-28).

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logy have, in our own day, been largely relegated to a subsidiary place. There is hardly any great religious teacher contending for them now in their entirety. Every leading thinker sees that the ideas of the past are insufficient for an interpretation of the present. The failure to grasp this truth by so many of the religious leaders of the past has done incalculable injury to religion as a civilising and moralising factor in the progress of mankind. The enemies—the greatest enemies—of religion have often been the truest friends of religion. So many religious teachers have been fighting so long for the “letter” of religion—for its “clothing”—that they have utterly failed to distinguish between its “clothing” and its substance. As we shall see at a later stage in this volume, until the eyes of religious teachers are opened wide to the meaning, value, and significance of all the knowledge that has been won during these latter years, the true pathway to religious progress will inevitably remain blocked.

But, on the other hand, we must not

forget that science, though it has revealed to us many new truths in the realms of nature, history, and man, is still not capable of explaining *everything* in this wide universe. It, too, has been fighting against what does not belong to its own proper domain, and what is of a totally different nature from the physical things of the universe or the mere record and description of the events of history. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, intoxicated by the sweeping victories which attended its inductive method of procedure, it subjected man's mind and spirit to the same tests as had been used in connection with fossils and animals. It shouted on the housetops that the "riddle of the universe" had been solved, and that everything had been reduced to mechanical and chemical processes and laws. The "soul" was banished from the whole universe, and a belief in it or in God was looked upon as belonging to a stage of superstition which, unfortunately, had to be passed through in order that the "new gospel" of materialism

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might "redeem" the world. The history of the later half of the nineteenth century and of the first decade of the present will be looked upon by the thinkers of the future with a smile of strange surprise. Haeckel and his fellow-monists will be remembered as those who could not conceive of any kind of reality which did not lend itself to the senses—as those on whom it did not dawn that Thought is necessary in order to propound any theory, however childish it may be, and in order to bring each and every branch of science into existence and to promote its future development. But who asserts to-day that mind and thought are wholly physical things, or the products of things purely mechanical? No one, except a very few who are obliged to make assumptions as vast as those propounded in any traditional theology, and of far less real value than these.

It will be shown in the succeeding chapters that the death of materialism has actually taken place, especially in so far as it is no

longer a sufficient explanation of the origin of life, mind, and spirit.

In the best scientific and philosophic thought of our own day the following conclusion has been reached. On the one hand, human knowledge—scientific, historical, and philosophical—has changed our conceptions of the universe and of life, and has rendered the old theological notions untenable. Much has gone—much that served as a prop for religion in the past, but was, in reality, not the inner nucleus of religion itself. Religious people must courageously face this truth, and an enormous responsibility rests on those teachers who know the situation and yet are too timid to put it boldly before the people. There is no solution to the religious problem until this fact of the enormous changes that have actually taken place has been forced upon the attention of the world. This is by no means all that must be taught; but if there is ignorance or fear on this one point, there will constantly be entanglements which will

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prevent religion from having the influence it otherwise could or should have upon the deepest mind of man.

On the other hand, the situation of science has to be presented not only with regard to its undisputed results, but also with regard to its failure to deal adequately with man from the side of his intellectual, moral, social, and religious needs. In fact, science can present the history of these needs and define them by means of abstractions only in the form of laws. Even the very laws which form the ideal of science do not correspond to any objects in the external world, but constitute mental constructions, or models, framed by thought after an observation of *some* of the qualities of objects in the external world.

Further, the scientific treatment of the meaning of Life, of the connection of Body and Mind, has undergone a profound change during the past decade, and seems destined to change even greater in the coming years.

We ought, then, to be made aware of

the truths of the natural sciences, and, at the same time, to be made aware of their limits. But as it is impossible for us to leave the mind and spirit of man without investigation, we shall have to turn elsewhere than to science for the explanation of the phenomena of consciousness and the results which flow from such phenomena. It is for this reason that emphasis should be laid on the two aspects which have already been noticed, viz. the attitude of traditional theology, and the attitude of science towards religion. The former offers too much which has not been proved true, and offers it at the risk of contradicting the results of ages of human thought and scientific inquiry. It has been, on the whole, the main cause of the alienation of a large portion of mankind from religious organisations, and has helped to form in the minds of great numbers of people an empirical and agnostic bias and temper. I say, *on the whole*, because the other factor which has helped to produce the partial decay of religion in our generation has

come from the side of science. Empirical science, until the last few years, had endeavoured to reduce the highest things to their lowest common factor. But very many of the leaders of science, none the less, came to the conclusion that this method of treating the reality of mind and spirit could not yield a final explanation of that reality. Unfortunately, the empirical portions of their teaching got into the hands of lesser men—men who were blind to every kind of reality which was not sensuous in its nature. It is, indeed, difficult to determine with any precision the proportion of blame which belongs to traditional theology and to science for leading the modern world on paths of negation and sterility concerning man's spiritual potencies.

To-day, these two aspects are giving place to a *third* mode of conceiving the universe and life. It is now generally recognised that no single branch of human knowledge is capable of deciding every issue involved in these two questions of life

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and the universe. The fact is, that the two are so vast that it is impossible any longer for any one observer to view the whole field of knowledge, and far less is it possible for him to become a master in all the branches of knowledge. But it is possible, in departments outside our own special one, to study and to utilise the results of others; it is possible to benefit from these and to have our views of life and the universe constantly enlarged and deepened by them. Each science, of course, has the whole of the universe and of life in one sense as its subject-matter, for we cannot say that there are any portions of reality to be lopped off from the rest as useless. If we knew the "flower in the crannied wall . . . we should know what God and man is." That may be true, as we shall presently see, in metaphysics and religion, but there is also another kind of knowledge of the flower, where it is sufficient and even necessary merely to take it and its surrounding "crannied wall" into account.

Each science deals with certain pieces of reality, and attempts to interpret them; it leaves an unexplained residuum to other sciences, and each of these sciences, in its turn, passes some of its problems over to other sciences. When we arrive at the work proper of the mental sciences, especially in the spheres of Logic, Metaphysics, and Religion, we are dealing with the results and the fundamental conceptions of the various sciences, and are trying to interpret them within a new world of thought and value. It will thus be noticed that when we pass from the natural to the mental sciences we pass to a *second kind of world* which grows out of the world of nature. A great many of the present day leaders of philosophical and religious thought are so convinced of this truth that they look upon it as the only pathway to religion and to God. We must begin at the very bottom, dealing with the solid earth and all its manifestations, and, step by step, pass upward, following all the demands of thought as well as all the

demands of our own nature. It is agreed by practically all the great thinkers of our day that thus and only thus can we pass beyond the boundaries of sense to a transcendent world of thought and goodness and holiness.

The object of this volume is to show this truth, to set it forth as the only foundation upon which the religion of the future can be built and rendered secure against all attacks made upon it by any branch of science. In fact, proceeding in this manner, we shall leave behind us the conflicts of religion and science; for science will have passed over to religion its best results as factors for a partial interpretation of life and the universe; and religion will take up such factors and fit them into the true places which the constructions of Logic, Ethics, and Metaphysics have made.

We shall now turn to some of these fundamental problems, and see their bearing on religion, constantly remembering that our pathway is first of all inductive

—leading from the simple to the complex, and thus yielding a general result which, in its turn, explains all the particular facts which present themselves to the mind. In other words, there is no breach between the “flower in the crannied wall” and God, but between the “flower” and God there is a continuous passage from one to the other, though each is found on a different level. We are bound to conceive of reality in all its aspects in exactly the same way as we conceive of different portions, of physical reality as being up or down, right or left, here or there, and so forth. The evolution of reality within the soul includes reality from its lowest and empirical to its highest and eternal level.

CHAPTER II

MATTER AND LIFE

IN considering the course of human thought, we discover that a persistent attempt has been made to reach an interpretation of the whole universe. Men have never, for the most part, been satisfied with fragments of existence, but have felt the need of an all-embracing view of the universe and man's place within it. The history of this attempt is interesting and astonishing. We see how numerous and how varied have been the efforts to obtain and present a complete picture of the universe—a picture in which everything could be seen in its relation to everything else, and in which all the parts could be viewed in their relation to the whole, and the whole viewed as *one*, and including within itself all the *parts*. Now, it is at

once evident that to no individual is given the power to view *all* the objects of the universe. The *parts* when minutely investigated have revealed so many comprehensive meanings that each part has sufficed to take up the whole of the investigator's life. The universe, in other words, is too vast to be examined as a whole: a single corner of the field has had to be examined, and incessant labour expended on this for any real gain to knowledge to accrue. And this has consistently been the method of science. It has proceeded on the lines of a "division of labour," and all its greatest successes have been achieved in this manner.

In the pre-scientific period the world was viewed as far as possible in its entirety. This, of course, was not, as already suggested, quite possible; but by leaving the *parts* on one side and constantly contemplating the universe as far as possible as a *whole*, a more embracing picture of the universe was obtained than could ever have been gained by working entirely in the

field of one of the *parts*, and ignoring all the other *parts* which were not closely connected therewith. Besides this, wider views of the universe, obtained at the expense of the meaning which the *parts* gave to the *whole*, were brought in by fancy and imagination to complete the picture. Man saw many things happening in the universe which bore a close resemblance to what takes place in the human body and mind in the course of their activities. All these suggestions were carried over into the endeavour to give a meaning of the universe, and led at last to the ascription of a Creator and Sustainer to all that is. It is not held in this volume that such a construction, and the conviction from which it flows, is without value. Indeed, it still makes its appeal to a large portion of the human race, and, since it arrives at a conclusion which is similar to the one arrived at by the best religious metaphysic of the present day, it is thoroughly justified. But from an intellectual standpoint the conclusions of the pre-scientific period cannot claim

the same force as the conclusions which investigators have reached in regard to the nature of the particular *part* they are examining. The *part* that is being examined often contradicts the pre-scientific conclusion, and there are no means possible by which the pre-scientific observer can answer the man of science. Often the man of science is in the wrong, because what is true of a *part* as a *part* may be quite false when the *part* is taken as exhausting the meaning of the whole of the boundless universe. If the pre-scientific observer is beset by the danger of building a totality, or whole, at the expense of the multiplicity of parts which go to form the whole, the scientific observer is just as much beset by the danger of ignoring the *whole* in his enthusiasm for the meaning which is continually found in the parts in their isolation.

Up to the present day, there have been combatants on each side—on the side of the *whole* and on the side of the *parts*—with the disastrous result that no intelligent, satisfy-

ing view of the universe could be obtained from either of them. The combatants could never come to an agreement because one combatant viewed the universe at the expense of the *parts*, and the other at the expense of the *whole*.

Nearly all men of science are aware of this fact, and they admit the difficulty making headway towards a truer view of the universe than is presented either by traditional theology with its easy smugness, or by natural science with its mere examination of fragments of the universe. Consequently, men of science have seen the necessity of probing the general presuppositions and results of natural science itself. They perceive that the very methods employed by the natural scientist, although he may be unaware of it in examining his facts, constitute a region quite distinct from that of the isolated facts in the external world. Natural science has to examine its own presuppositions, frame its own hypotheses, test its results, establish the meaning

of its fundamental conceptions. All this belongs to the realm of Logic and Metaphysics, and therefore includes *something more* than the mere object under investigation or the mere description of the nature of that object in its immediate surroundings. On the one hand, the object connects itself with the whole universe; and, on the other, its meaning and interpretation are based upon the character of the object in its relation to complexes of thought which have grown up in the mind from its prior experiences, and which are considered valid because they have worked. This, and much more than this, has compelled most natural scientists to recognise the need for a Philosophy of Science or a Metaphysic of Nature for the interpretation of facts and for obtaining Standards which give different valuations to the facts. Such a Philosophy of Science is further able to give a meaning to the separate results of the various sciences in their interrelation. This it is capable of doing in terms of logical thought, and one

of the main characteristics of logical thought is that in viewing the meaning of the parts it is able, as it were, to pack them together into one parcel, and thus to regard the various domains, however different they may be, as constituting one world. What we have to bear in mind here is that such a meaning of the world as *one* has been obtained by taking all the fragments into account, bringing them home to the mind, and allowing that mind to reflect over them in their relations. The *conclusion* which is thus formed is the meaning of the world and the conception of it as *one*. Of course such a meaning is never final, and it is on account of this that science contains a perpetually *ideal* element. This meaning is not something purely material, for it could never have arisen without the mind and its logical activity. And neither is the meaning purely subjective—a mere projection of human imagination into the universe—for the meaning could never have arisen without taking the facts of the external world into account. We conclude,

therefore, that the meaning of the universe is partially true, because it includes both the elements of mind and the facts of the world. There could be no world for us without our minds, and there could be no minds without the world. This truth is accepted in some form or other by those philosophers of nature who, at the same time, are natural scientists. It is impossible here to enter into the metaphysical implications which arise from the short sketch already given, for it is practically impossible to show the place of Metaphysics in Science in a few words. The subject would require a volume by itself. But it is to be hoped that scientific and religious teachers are becoming more and more aware of the importance of the rôle of Metaphysics which has been outlined here. By this means we become aware of the truth that the meaning of the universe and life is to be obtained through the union of thought and external fact. In other words, we cannot view the universe without ourselves, and we

cannot view ourselves without the universe.

But the main idea which has already been set forth in this chapter is the view of the universe as *Many* (as parts) and the need of passing beyond the parts in order to view it as *One* (as a whole). The scale of the various natural and mental sciences leads us from the Many to the One in the form of *meaning*. Each science has its Many (its parts) and its One (its whole). The *Ones* of the various sciences, as we mount up the scale, are several, are *many*: these consequently are treated as parts on the plane above their own oneness and wholeness, and they finally merge into a totality that is formed within the conclusions of a more comprehensive domain of knowledge and life. And it is thus that we rise from science to philosophy, from philosophy to religion, and from religion to ultimate Reality. This ultimate Reality is not anything that has been brought forth by mere fancy. The Reality has been brought forth by the world and its mean-

ing as these gradually reveal themselves in human consciousness. The meaning of consciousness and, indeed, of the whole of life, is found in climbing these stairs which start in a world of sense and pass into the ultimate Reality that is in all and above all. The whole of the result we have arrived at is a demand of thought; the nature of the result is nothing other than the nature of thought at its fullest expansion and depth. Of course we are able to take snapshot views of the universe in our ordinary daily life, and it is necessary for us to do so. We cannot be solving problems of metaphysics or experiencing the fulness of ultimate Reality when we have to balance our accounts and pay our debts. But there is at the back of every figure that we add a metaphysic whose depth cannot be fathomed. One thing lies beneath another in this world so that we can never reach the bottom and understand in its entirety the deepest "ground" of things. But man can go deeper and deeper, and it is in this constant

attempt, when time allows freedom from the details of life, that the fullest meaning, value, and significance of life consist. It is safe for us to go farther and say that in the degree in which penetration beneath the surface-level of the daily vocation takes place, in that degree alone can man hope to find an actual evolution of his deeper nature.

This truth has impressed itself so much upon men of science at the present day that most of them are endeavouring to place before us theories of the universe and of life. These theories deal, in the main, with *matter and life*. In other words, we may designate the two opposing theories which are generally presented as *mechanistic* and *dynamic*.

In spite of the fact that the parts get their meaning in a whole, it must not be supposed that there is but one whole on the levels of science and philosophy. There are at least the two opposing ones of mechanistic and dynamic. The former has lost its old superiority. It is very old—at

least it is present in some of the speculations of the early Greek thinkers—and it has been resuscitated time after time in the history of thought. No doubt the idealism of Plato and the various forms of Neoplatonism at various periods in our Christian era accomplished much, but they were on the whole constructions which had been reached at the expense of the facts of nature, and were consequently bound to undergo serious modifications. And the disappearance of speculation as well as the rise of induction in modern times necessitated a break with the old idealism and gave rise to a materialism which has exercised an enormous influence for good in the history of scientific and philosophic thought. The *quantitative* way of conceiving the universe was emphasised, and the mechanical processes of inorganic and organic things received their full share of attention alongside of the psychical processes. But during the latter half of the nineteenth century some scientific men were not satisfied with the reduction of all processes to two—a

physical and a psychical—and their endeavour was to resolve every psychical process into a mechanical process. Few of these were men of eminence, and increasing investigation has relegated their teaching, especially in so far as the psychical manifests itself in the highest experiences of mind, to the realm of oblivion. Haeckel and Loeb are the only two scientists of note who stand for a thoroughgoing materialism.¹ Haeckel's Law of Substance and Loeb's "chemical mechanisms," "tropisms," and "instincts" are supposed by them to explain everything. Personally, I acquiesce in much that Haeckel and Loeb say, but they say nothing with regard to human consciousness and its capacity to read the world and to progress in its interpretation of life and the universe. Both are blind to the reality of thought. Reality for them is the sensuous, the tangible, and nothing more, unless they smuggle in general mental notions under a physical garb. It

¹ Cf. Haeckel, *The Riddle of the Universe* and *The Wonders of Life*; Loeb, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*.

may be safely said that the day of both is passed. Their place has been taken by scientists with wider outlook and more comprehensive minds.

As examples of this statement, let us take two scientists who are typical of the general trend of science to-day—Ostwald and Schäfer.

Ostwald, for many years professor of chemistry at Leipzig, and for some years the "head" of the monistic propaganda in Germany, cannot certainly be held to favour a materialistic monism pure and simple. His doctrine of Energetics is dualistic in its nature. He holds energy as being different in its nature from matter, although the two are closely connected throughout the whole universe from the most primordial forms right up to human consciousness and all that it contains. It cannot be said that Ostwald's conception of energy is mental or spiritual, but it is certainly a reality other than material. He is aware of the impossibility of establishing a theory of the universe

or of life on the basis of pure materialism. He discovers this impossibility not only in the higher phenomena of organic life and of mind, but also in all inorganic phenomena. The question arises, What is this Reality that is designated as energy and conceived of in a manner different from that of mechanical physics? We are bound to conclude that it is something more akin to mind or spirit than to matter. The consequence of such a conclusion leads the mind inevitably to the conception of a Reality other than matter as eternally operative in all the matter of the universe. Ostwald has attempted to reduce all things to a common denominator and source, and his result is a kind of dualism even where the meaning and content of the phenomena are least of all discernible. It will be shown in a later chapter that the dualism is still more clearly perceptible as we ascend the scale of existence, and as matter and mind, though still closely connected, reveal divergences which compel the reflective mind to give them a different origin and value.

The main point to be emphasised here is that *two* characteristics constitute the nature of the universe and life—matter and energy. The world has drifted into materialism because it has, at the expense of the facts, magnified the former and minimised the latter.¹

What has been stated above deals mainly with the domains of Physics and Chemistry, and we have seen that such domains are far from being the seat of materialism. If this is so within the region where matter is most prominently present, how much more is it when we turn to Biology, the science of Life. If we look at the teaching of a representative biologist and physiologist, we find that here again the conclusion arrived at is far from being materialistic in its nature. E. A. Schäfer's address as president of the British Association (1912) created a good deal of uneasiness at the time of its delivery in the minds of many religious people. But

¹ Cf. Ostwald, *Natural Philosophy, Energetics*, and other works.

there was absolutely no room for alarm of any kind whatever in connection with it, for Schäfer, too, has his dualism although that dualism does not lie in the same place as Ostwald's. Schäfer's dualism lies between the life of consciousness and organic life. He states, by making great assumptions which he cannot prove, that Life may be at some time in the future manufactured in the laboratory. It is doubtless true that the biochemical elements of life play a far more important rôle than was previously assigned to them. But Schäfer is guarded enough in the authoritative version of his address to state that in all he asserts he is not speaking of the life of the soul.¹ In other words, he is not speaking of the life of consciousness as this wells up into thoughts, aspirations, ideals, morality, and religion. He is careful enough to realise that a problem lies within the fact and content of human consciousness which cannot be solved by a reduction to its lowest terms. Here, again, we are face to face

¹ *Life: its Nature, Origin, and Maintenance.*

with a dualism between the content of consciousness and the natural life of man from the cradle to the tomb.

Let us turn for a moment to the consequences which would accrue if this fact again were emphasised. Schäfer is quite correct in stating that men have a good deal of work to do in order to establish upon a solid foundation the reality of this life of the soul. But it may be retorted that infinitely more has been done even in this direction than many of our scientists are aware of. What has been done in the direction of establishing the substantiality and self-subsistence of the life of the spirit cannot be known as easily as the facts and results of the natural sciences. The objects of the latter are tangible to the senses, whilst the objects of the former are objects of thought; they are ideals whose reality does not consist in their having existence as things in space. When this fact is acknowledged the conflict between science and metaphysics will pass away, and the former

will view its results as not being final, but as results which have to pass over into the various domains of the mental sciences, whilst these latter sciences, in their turn, pass on their results into the domain of religion. Schäfer is aware that there is no terminus in natural science—a terminus where the universe and life obtain their final meaning. For, indeed, the conceptions of science itself are in perpetual flux; and, besides this, the mental sciences have to handle perpetually new material, and consequently to frame ever new syntheses.

We may now turn to a form of dualism between life and matter in still another place than those places just referred to.

One of the most remarkable biological movements of our day is that termed *neovitalism*, and the discussions concerning it are only just beginning. As already stated, the latter half of the nineteenth century had become so engrossed in the *thinghood*

of all phenomena and their relative aspects that it reduced practically everything to matter and motion. This is the story of the development of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, and, partly, psychology. Darwin's works gave great impetus to this movement, and the gains which accrued to science by the employment of the methods of observation, experiment, and induction have been enormous. It is not only legitimate but absolutely necessary to employ these methods and to resolve everything into a few simple, fundamental factors. Indeed, in the future, they will continue to form one of the main resources of the natural sciences, and in their continued application lies the sure hope for the further advancement of the various sciences. But some biologists are becoming aware that the category of mechanism, though it includes inorganic phenomena, cannot account for the rise of life itself.

The chief representative of this *neo-vitalistic* movement in our day is Hans

Driesch.¹ He has made the subject of the origin of life one of observation and experiment. After observing and experimenting upon various forms of life, he has come to the conclusion that a non-mechanical factor is present. In the phenomenon of Regeneration—recuperation of lost parts—the mechanical and chemical theory collapses. For example, the cleavage of the egg of the sea-urchin in producing two perfect eggs; the behaviour of certain *tubularia* in recuperating lost parts; the reconstruction of the newt's eye—these and many other remarkable phenomena have led Driesch to the only conclusion which the facts seem to warrant, and its issue is a theory of life which is non-mechanical in its nature. The further details of this important theory do not fall within the scope of this volume. We are here dealing with conclusions which biological science presents as an interpretation of life.

¹ The following works of Driesch may now be obtained in English: *The Philosophy of the Organism*, *The Problem of Individuality*, and *The Theory and History of Vitalism*.

To gather together the fragments touched upon in this chapter, we find that Haeckel and Loeb start from huge assumptions in their endeavour to establish a mechanistic theory of life and the universe. They appropriate mental conceptions, strip them of their meaning, and finally reduce them to what has no meaning. It is at once seen by most of our scientists that such a process is nothing more than an illusion. We do not in reality fully explain anything when any factor is left out of consideration, and least of all do we explain any phenomenon, whose reality consists in its meaning and significance, by a mere description of the history of its physical clothing from the present to the past or from the past to the present. Even Haeckel himself in a naïve kind of way seems to be aware of this truth. At the close of his *Riddle of the Universe* he states that we, too, must have our goddesses—the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.

Ostwald feels the need for a philosophy of

the universe as distinguished from natural science, and his conclusion, in the main, tends in the direction of metaphysics. In spite of his effort to establish a monism of Energetics, he has still energy and matter on his hands, and finds that the behaviour of the latter is subject to the influence of the former. And the former is more akin to spirit than to matter!

Schäfer would look upon life as purely mechanistic, but clearly states that he does not speak of the life of the "soul." And further, he sees that science, from a purely materialistic standpoint, can say nothing of the life of the "soul." Here, once more, we find it necessary to examine the life of the "soul." How otherwise can we know it? And the knowledge of it is to be found in the logical meanings and values which present themselves to thought, feeling, and will. What is greatly needed to-day is the carrying out of the hint given by Schäfer—to study the life of the spirit.

Driesch finds that we are compelled to

study life under categories other than material ones. Even in the study of all forms of life a view of the universe has to be adopted which leads to a *metaphysic of nature*. In the study of life as it reveals itself in consciousness a *metaphysic of life* is the inevitable result. And the two metaphysics are necessary. The latter metaphysic deals with the universe that is *within*—that is revealed in logical thought, ethics, and ideals, and which constructs a world of its own—the climax of the evolution of the soul.

The various aspects which have been raised here may be supplemented still further. In his *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, J. S. Haldane agrees with much that Haeckel, Loeb, Ostwald, and Schäfer have to say, and is even unwilling to accept the *neo-vitalistic* standpoint of Driesch. But he sees clearly that though the biochemical processes of all forms of life must not be neglected, it is quite illegitimate to reduce life to matter. A new category has to be adopted to interpret life—the category of *life itself*. And life, especi-

ally on its human side, passes beyond the physical world. It becomes a power for the creation and, what is more, for the development of personality by means of the ideals which present themselves before man, and which, if they are partially realised, grant him an existence in a world of mind and spirit. Thus for the interpretation of human life Haldane passes from the natural sciences to what is beyond them. The whole of experience has to be taken into account, and our conscious relations to spiritual reality must be insisted upon. Some powerful remarks are further found in Haldane's final chapter, where he deals with personality from the standpoints of Kant and Hegel. No true account of this phenomenon of personality is to be found in biology. Philosophy, we are told, leads up to personality, the great central fact of the universe. And the true conception of personality is not anything merely individual or national, but includes within itself the whole universe. It is in this way that all the ulti-

mate problems found in consciousness are to be faced. We are certain of the fact that personality is spiritual in its nature; and it is in the light of this fact that we are able to free ourselves from all narrow definitions, and come finally to realise that the wider personality that is in us will still live on though we as individuals perish, for "this world, with all that lies within it, is a spiritual world."¹

Our final conclusion may then be summed up as follows: Science has established a mechanical view of life and the universe which cannot be gainsaid. But such a view is no more than a partial interpretation and explanation of the universe and life, and will inevitably lead, if followed far enough, to a further, more comprehensive view. This more comprehensive view may be necessitated even by the conception of Energetics. Enough is not known as yet on this point to warrant any definite conclusion. But enough is known concerning life, even in its

¹ J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 133.

lowest forms, to reject as entirely unwarrantable the materialistic monism which was so prevalent until lately. In life a *new* phenomenon makes its appearance, and it has to be interpreted in terms of its own meaning and value and not merely in terms of its history on its physical side. And when human consciousness is reached, something again *new* makes its appearance, and it likewise, in its turn, has to be interpreted in the same manner—in terms of its own meaning and value.

We consequently arrive at the conclusion that mechanism probably holds with regard to matter; that life is not entirely mechanism though mechanism is found in it; and that consciousness exhibits a further stage of reality—a reality that has constructed all that is best in the social and moral world as well as in the individual personality. We are therefore partially rooted in the material world, but in mind and spirit the beginning of a new order of existence springs up—an order which can be developed without end.

CHAPTER III

BODY AND MIND

No branch of knowledge is more difficult of investigation than that concerning the relation of Body and Mind. In the past, especially among religious people, the problem was easily solved by believing that God had breathed into man's body an immaterial element. This belief is adhered to in the best psychology of the present, but the meaning attached to it is not the same as that which theologians in general understand. Psychologists have reached their conclusions from the investigations they have made concerning the relation of body and mind. There are at least three main hypotheses as to this relation. Taking G. F. Stout as our guide here—and it is doubtful whether we can get a better one in this world—let us consider

these hypotheses in language as non-technical as the subject-matter allows.

There are, in the main, three alternative possibilities—interaction, one-sided action, and simple concomitance. On the interaction hypothesis, a cerebral process may produce a state of consciousness, just as a nervous process may produce a muscular contraction, or as change in one part of the cortex may produce change in another part; and, inversely, a conscious process, such as a volition, may act on the cortex, just as the cortex acts on sub-cortical centres, and these on the muscles.¹

Stout shows that the main objection to this view is “that it is utterly incongruous with the conception of causation on which the whole system of our knowledge both of physical and psychical process is based.”²

That body has effect upon mind and mind upon body is not a sufficient explanation of the connection. We do not explain anything by stating such a fact of connection.

To explain is to exhibit a fact as a resultant of its factors. This is the ideal of science,

¹ Stout, *Manual of Psychology* (2nd ed.), p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

and it is never completely attained. But in so far as it is unattained, our knowledge is felt to be incomplete.¹

This hypothesis presents serious difficulties, and is also, as already stated, unsatisfactory because it explains nothing concerning any factor which is common to both body and mind.

The second alternative, one-sided action, either of body on mind, or of mind on body, is open to objections similar to those brought against interaction. "It also involves the additional difficulty that all other action with which we are acquainted, is interaction." The one-sided action is supposed, by the advocates of this theory, to be on the side of body (or matter). But as Stout points out and in this most of the psychologists of our day agree with him:

The process of consciousness cannot be analysed or resolved into such processes as chemical and physical changes in the nerve cells. If consciousness is supposed to be pro-

¹ Stout, *Manual of Psychology* (2nd ed.), p. 46.

duced by the nervous process, the production is simply creation out of nothing. An objection of an equally serious kind is that the materialistic theory destroys all possibility of agency on the part of conscious beings. . . . Materialism makes impossible any real operation of consciousness of any kind whatever.¹

The third hypothesis differs from the other two inasmuch as it states the facts

without implying direct interaction between nervous and conscious change, and without implying that the one creates the other. The formula which it uses for this purpose is that of psycho-physical parallelism, which simply states that modifications of consciousness emerge contemporaneously with corresponding modifications of nervous process.²

It is inexpedient to discuss further here this matter in the language of Psychology; but that which issues from the connection of body and mind is so far-reaching that it bears upon all the problems of human life and destiny. Here we see that the

¹ Stout, *Manual of Psychology* (2nd ed.), p. 50.

² *Ibid.*

psychologists of every country are practically agreed that whatever else consciousness is it is not matter. The late William James emphasised the same fact:

When the psychologist, who thinks that his science cuts off all hope of immortality, pronounces the phrase, "Thought is a function of the brain," he thinks of the matter just as he thinks, when he says, "Steam is a function of the tea-kettle," "Light is a function of the electric circuit," "Power is a function of the moving waterfall." In these latter cases the several material objects have the function of inwardly creating or engendering their effects, and their function must be called *productive* function.¹

The physiologist is sometimes apt to think that it is so with the brain. It is supposed to engender consciousness much as it engenders carbonic acid; the relation of the brain to the soul's life is supposed to mean no more than this productive function, so that the soul must merely perish when the physical organ perishes.

¹ James, *Human Immortality*, p. 28.

But, as James points out, "We have also releasing or permissive function; and we have transmissive function."¹

In his great volumes—*The Principles of Psychology*—James has insisted upon the intimate connection of body and mind as well as upon their reciprocal effects. But he was too learned in the fundamental principles of Physiology and Psychology to make the mistake so often committed by lesser men to assert that mind has emerged from a purely physical and mechanical soil. In this respect he was at one with world-renowned men such as Ward, Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Ladd, Stout, Bosanquet, Lloyd-Morgan, and many others. James was convinced that the facts of the connection of body and mind, and what results from such connection, demand an hypothesis other than any materialistic one. He agrees with Wundt in the emphasis which the latter lays on "the law of increase of spiritual energy"—a law which he opposes to the law of conservation

¹ James, *Human Immortality*, p. 30.

of energy in physical things.¹ James goes so far as to say that it is more probable that mind or spirit has radiated into body from the outside than to imagine that it owed its origin to some mechanical or chemical process. That hypothesis, we are told, is the only one which agrees with the phenomena of mind as at present known; and the whole tendency of modern psychological science seems to be pointing in the same direction. Indeed, we have already noticed in a previous chapter that even the phenomena of Life on levels below human consciousness cannot be made to fit into a biochemical mould. We are fully warranted, indeed, we are compelled by the latest investigations of modern biology, physiology, and psychology to grant consciousness a self-subsistence of its own however much body and mind seem to be one, or seem to interact on each other. Allowing, then, this self-subsistence to consciousness and, especially, to that portion of it which is generally termed *mind*, we dis-

¹ Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, p. 315 (1889).

cover that we are in the presence of another world than the one of physical things. Space will not allow us to develop this truth in the way it deserves, but it is evident that it has all-important bearings on our whole life and religion. Man has been too long clinging to the *physical* as the sole reality; he has too long been prone to look upon mind or spirit as something which is less real than the things of the physical world. Or, if not this, while he has admitted the reality of his own consciousness he has at the same time imagined that this consciousness of his is powerless without external aid to overcome matter and the evils of the world. The truth, on the other hand, urged by James and thinkers of his rank is that man is already the possessor of spiritual energies—in embryo, at least—which are capable of endless development.

There seems no formal limit to the positive increase of being in spiritual respects; and since spiritual being, whenever it comes, affirms itself, expands and craves continuance, we may justly

and literally say, regardless of the defects of our own private sympathy, that the supply of individual life in the universe can never possibly, however immeasurable it may become, exceed the demand. The demand for that supply is there the moment the supply itself comes into being, for the things supplied demand their own continuance.¹

The thesis that something is present in consciousness besides a mere echo of physical, nervous changes is practically everywhere the teaching of modern psychology. All this is a fact, and it remains now to be forced upon men's attention. Materialistic science and traditional theology have as yet paid but little heed to such a fact, and, in so far as they have done so at all, it has unfortunately been far more in order to ignore its bearings than to understand it in a deeper way.

We thus find here a demand of man's whole nature, not merely a blind wish which refuses to see contrary facts. For instance, the belief of many psychologists in the

¹ James, *Human Immortality*, p. 80.

continuity of consciousness as well as in some form of its permanence is a truth which is denied only by a surface-physiology and psychology. But when our investigations have reached a deeper layer, and when the whole nature of man has been brought under examination, the matter wears a very different colour all at once. A typical illustration of this is McDougall's great book on *Body and Mind*. The author starts by stating that he had no desire for immortality, and, in fact, his desire, as far as he was able to read it at all, pointed in a contrary direction. But the deeper he became aware of the history of the human consciousness, and the clearer he perceived the meaning and value of the various theories of the connection of body and mind, he was compelled, he says, to conclude that consciousness has characteristics and qualities which are not physical. The author uses the term Animism to designate these qualities of the soul.

The essential notion, which forms the common foundation of all varieties of Animism, is that all,

or some, of those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the corpse and from inorganic bodies are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not necessarily or always, conceived as an immaterial and individual being or soul.¹

The whole discussion of the volume is not concerned with the development of any kind of metaphysic of the soul, but deals entirely with the empirical sciences, and reaches the conclusion that life does not end with death, because it has qualities which are other than mechanical and chemical ones.

Finally, I wish to state emphatically that my inquiry is not conceived as a search for metaphysical truth, but that it is rather conducted by the methods and with the aims of all empirical science; that is to say, it aims at discovering the hypotheses which will enable us best to co-ordinate the chaotic data of immediate experience by means of a conceptual system as consistent as may be, while recognising that such conceptions must always be subject to

¹ McDougall, *Body and Mind*, p. viii.

revision with the progress of science. Of course, if the term metaphysic be taken in the older sense as implying an inquiry into that which is not physical, the theme of this work is metaphysical; but that is a usage which is no longer accepted; metaphysic is now distinguished from empirical science by its aims and methods rather than by its subject-matter. I claim, then, for the conception of the soul, advocated in the last chapter of this book, no more than that it is an hypothesis which is indispensable to science at the present time.¹

This conclusion has the utmost significance. The volume succeeds in proving that all the explanations of modern science are incapable of reducing the soul to a mere appendage of the body. It has a reality of its own—a reality which is immaterial in its nature. Here, then, is a conclusion which can prove of incalculable value to our modern world. The scientist has to listen to it: he has to become convinced that there are things on earth which can neither be seen nor heard nor touched with the hands, and that nevertheless these are

¹ McDougall, *Body and Mind*, p. xiv.

the great realities. The soul of man is the chief of them. Astounding ignorance prevails in the region of natural science concerning such a truth as the immateriality and substantiality of the soul. The result is that the mind which constantly deals with physical things reads the universe and human life only from one point of view—and no one point of view can embrace the whole that exists either in the universe or in life.

On the other hand, what a vast amount of ignorance exists with regard to the questions of the relation of body and mind, to leave all other questions out of account for the moment. There are many exceptions. One often comes across young men and women who, after the toil of the day, take advantage of the opportunities found in some of our towns for the study of modern psychology. Unfortunately, very few religious institutions find it worth while to shake their young people out of their lethargy, and to instil into them a love of knowledge.

Patching together—either from a traditional or modern standpoint—verses from the Bible to frame a theory of the universe and of life is insufficient. Such verses generally constitute material for the soul, and no serious-minded man and woman can ever speak lightly of the immeasurable help they have received from them. There is a place for all this, too, in the growing religious feeling of the young. But it is necessary for them to become aware that science and philosophy work towards genuine religion, and possess knowledge which yields us a spiritual interpretation of the universe and of life. When we view the past quarter of a century, and see the enormous number of promising young men and women who have drifted away from institutional religion, the picture is enough to sadden the most optimistic heart. There is a real danger that religious institutions will fail more and more to help the intelligent young of our generation unless they endeavour to make them conversant with the contributions of

modern knowledge to the life of the spirit of man and to show them the infinite importance of its development. Something is happening the whole time in our world which necessitates a change in our intellectual conceptions regarding life and the universe. So many good and able men stand staggered when they witness how little the scientific and philosophic basis of religion is understood by the young who are so well equipped in other respects.

We utter this as a plea for a return to a knowledge of ourselves—to a positive conviction which cannot be shaken, because it is grounded even in the very best science, of the presence of an immaterial life within the soul. It requires some time to habituate ourselves to its reality, because of its immateriality. But every moment given to the fact that such a life, though connected with the body and in perpetual need of the body, is a reality of its own, will enable a man to become convinced also that somehow, he knows not how, the life of his soul

has had a heavenly origin, and wends its way towards its heavenly home. He need not trouble about the details—about filling in the map of his pre-natal country or his post-natal home. There is no complete answer to these questions from the speculative side, but there is something of an answer to them on the road of the present—a present which carries its past within itself, and pushes ever forward towards the future.¹ It is well that the conviction should be grounded upon a fact. A fact it is that mechanism cannot account for the life of the soul, and that, indeed, the life of the soul has an existence of its own in the meanings and values and the deeper experiences it is able to formulate. For it is thus alone that the meaning of the physical, and even still more of the logical, ethical, and religious experiences can be made clear. The world and all it contains alter their appearance when they are viewed in the light of the

¹ Cf. Bergson's *Creative Evolution* on this point.

conviction of the spiritual reality that exists within consciousness.

“Then at new flood of customary morn,
Look at her through her showers,
Her mists, her streaming gold,
A wonder edges the familiar face:
She wears no more that robe of printed
hours;
Half strange seems earth and sweeter than
her flowers.”¹

But the change within has to take place before the change without can become perceptible.

The late Ludwig Busse of Königsberg, in his classical volume on *Mind and Body*,² tells us that the problems of life and philosophy can be partially solved only in the degree in which we obtain a correct interpretation of the relation of mind and body. Another great psychologist—Ebbinghaus—comes to the same conclusion.³ Indeed, it

¹ George Meredith's *Poetical Works*, *Meditation under Stars*, p. 367.

² Busse, *Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib*.

³ Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, vol. i.

may be safely said that such is the tendency of nearly the whole of our modern psychology. If this teaching can be utilised by mankind it will exercise an enormous influence, for it will show man that, alongside of the reality of his own body another reality—a spiritual one—is present, and grows by turning all its possibilities into operation. We are thus living in a spiritual world in the midst of the present world; that spiritual world has, in the first place, to be known, and this knowledge has to be turned into something other than itself—into an experience of the soul.

CHAPTER IV

INTELLECT AND INTUITION

WE have sketched so far some of the most important views concerning the universe and life. We have seen how materialistic monism has been discarded; and how scientists have stated that the "soul" cannot be manufactured in a laboratory. The conclusion we have been obliged to accept is that there is something besides matter in the universe. This is not a subject of speculation, but of observation, experiment, and reflection. It has been illustrated by Ostwald in connection with his investigations on the properties of matter. It is important to emphasise this *method* of investigation, for the human mind demands some explanation of the universe as well as of its own life. And here we obtain

an interpretation of the universe in non-materialistic terms. It is to such a conclusion that modern Physics leads us. This conclusion is arrived at without taking into account any of the phenomena of life from their lowest to their highest forms. It was matter and its behaviour which brought us to the conclusion that the universe was something more than mere matter.

When we turn to life it is natural to expect that a still greater difference is to be found between matter and life than between matter and energy. This is exactly what we get in the writings of such men as Bergson, Driesch, and J. S. Haldane. The categories of physics and mechanism are shown to be insufficient to explain the phenomena of life. Driesch shows that this is so in regard to all the forms of life. Haldane, keeping closer to the biochemical side of life, still insists that consciousness is something other than a physiological process, and is capable of realising ends which it sets before itself, and of deepening its own character by so doing.

We must now pass to an investigation of the subject from another point of view. What is known of matter and life has become known by an examination of matter and life. Matter and life are investigated in order to reach their meaning. We have no reason for thinking that consciousness can reveal its meaning and significance without examination. The subject of consciousness is more difficult of examination than the subjects of the natural sciences. The behaviour of the latter is tangible to the senses, whilst the behaviour of consciousness is only partially tangible to the senses, and that only on its physical side. We have already noticed from the writings of a number of modern psychologists that mind and body, though connected in the most indissoluble manner, are yet different in their nature. The problem of the connection of mind and body is, then, twofold, in so far as a knowledge of mind is concerned. On the one hand, we have to know mind as it expresses itself in bodily movements, and, on the other, we have to

know mind as it expresses itself *in its own meaning*. The former aspect is treated by psychology; the latter by the various other branches of the mental sciences.

Having, therefore, concluded to a non-materialistic element in the universe, and having followed the clue of modern psychology in its establishment of the nature of mind as something different from body and its manifestations, we are now in a position to turn to consciousness itself, and to try and see what can be discovered there, especially in its relation to knowledge and life.

Although consciousness has a nature different from body, still the effects of the body upon it have been more clearly marked than ever before; and the connection will doubtless be still more clearly marked by the physiologists and psychologists of the future. Indeed, some eminent thinkers have been and are of the opinion that the two—body and mind—are one substance. But though this be so, that substance is not the “gaseous substance” of Haeckel and Loeb but a

“spiritual substance.” Whichever point of view is adopted, it is important to bear in mind that consciousness cannot be reduced to purely materialistic elements, but retains a certain superiority of its own—a superiority that becomes more and more prominent in the course of its own development. Consciousness, connected as it is with a material body, obtains help from the body and its functions in order to carry on its work. And, indeed, a great deal of the work of life is carried on without any discernible reflection on the part of the mind itself. Man has inherited a nervous organism which has been more and more perfected in the course of long ages; and this organism is capable of performing actions which are not the conscious results of thoughts and feelings. In the form of instinct many animals, birds, and insects are capable of achievements beyond the ingenuity of any human intelligence. If we had the power which some of the creatures below us possess, we could, for instance, bring the present war to an end in a comparatively

short time. It is generally admitted to be true that no human genius has appeared in the world who did not possess a nervous organism that had something characteristic and unique in it. Nearly everything depends upon the quality of the cells which form body, nerves, and brain, as well as upon which particular cells are dominant and which recessive. At the very lowest level of consciousness—the level of bare feeling—we may live a life which is a kind of *whole*, and which is comparatively pleasant. The distinction between subject and object has not yet appeared, and the subject feels himself at one with the universe. But very few human beings are able (even if they so wish it) to remain on this level of feeling. Consciousness and its objects do not fall entirely apart in our relation to the world around us; the world has to be perceived in fragments by the mind. But as we are capable of thinking of the world as *one*, there must be present in consciousness some power of bringing the fragments together and of

viewing them as a totality or whole. And it is this which actually happens. Consciousness finds itself, first of all, in a world in which man and the world are largely at one end with each other. This unity is broken up for the practical purposes of life, and is again gathered together in order to view things as a whole.

In what has already been said we have seen the functions of, and the differences between, intellect and intuition. The blind feeling which has more of body than of mind in it is a kind of instinct. Unfortunately, in man, it is incapable of doing much work until it is illumined by self-consciousness—until the blind feeling is dispersed, and until the chaos breaks up into various parts, and light is cast upon it by the intellect in order that it may prove of service to man. The unity of instinct gives way to the multiplicity of the intellect; and, in its turn, the multiplicity of the intellect gives way to what is often termed to-day intuition. In the writings of Bergson, this is the view, I

believe, which is taken concerning the nature of instinct and its relation to intelligence. When the blend of both takes place the result is intuition. It is thus clear that intuition is no ready-made faculty in man entirely separated from man's intelligence. *Intuition* consists, rather, of the totality that has taken place as a result of a process of *analysis*. We examine the object; we cut it up into fragments in order to deal with certain important aspects of it, for we cannot deal with all the aspects of the object at any one time. But the process of analysis, after information concerning the object has entered into the mind, gives way to a synthesis; and the result of this synthesis may be termed intuition.

It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an *intuition*, whilst everything else falls within the province of *analysis*. By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces

the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyse, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition be possible, is a simple act.¹

This standpoint is not far removed from that of the great idealists of our day. The difference in Bergson's standpoint is largely due to his use of some terms contrary to philosophic usage. It is certainly true that in the process of analysis the mind perceives only a portion of the characteristics of its

¹ Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 7.

object, but the mind is capable by means of its own power of bringing the parts together, and by means of "intellectual sympathy" of combining them into a whole. The richness of the characteristics of the object and the oneness of the subject and the object are engendered by the mind reacting upon the material that enters through the senses and bringing forth a totality or whole out of the various fragments. If intuition means anything other than this it means that we must return to the standpoint of the animal in viewing any object, and in believing that the animal view of the object is higher than the view which gives a meaning and value to the object in its relation to the percipient. It is impossible to believe anything of the kind without undoing all that has developed in our world since man became the possessor of mind. The intellect does take up the "snapshots" of reality: these snapshots melt in a totality of meaning brought forth by the power of mind and spirit. Thus, as has been noticed before, a second kind of world arises

by the side of the bare physical world. This is in the main the attitude of idealism. But the writer who has most of all called attention to the subject of intellect and intuition is Henri Bergson. As already hinted, it is necessary to bear in mind that no writer of importance looks upon intuition as being composed of any ready-made ideas present in the mind prior to experience. Kant, with his various forms of the *a priori*, is often misrepresented on this point. All that can be said with regard to intuition prior to experience is that the organism has inherited a fully-equipped nervous mechanism for receiving and recording impressions from the external world, and also, in man, a consciousness or soul which constitutes a potency for converting these impressions into *meaning*, and of bringing them into a unity or whole.

Bearing this in mind, we are now able to turn again to some of the main aspects of Bergson's teaching on this subject, especially in its bearings on the life which lies deeper than that of intellect. For when

we do this we are in presence of a train of thought which tends in the direction of religion, although it may not employ theological and religious terms.

According to Bergson there are two kinds of knowledge—one kind stops at the relative, whilst the second leads to the absolute.

Consider a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would no longer be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of the character, continually enriched that idea, without ever completing it. The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves to the idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary, to detach

themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it or impoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the man provide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. All the traits which describe him, and which can make him known to me only by so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are signs by which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points of view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he has in common with others and not what belongs to him and to him alone. But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else. Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute.¹

Bergson's main point in this passage, and, indeed, throughout his works, is to show that man is capable of an experience and a knowledge deeper than that which the intellect can possibly give in the form of concepts. The knowledge which the intellect

¹ Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 3.

gives is relative to other things. It consists in an analysis of the object under investigation, and in the abstraction of some one or more qualities from the object in order to help us in connection with the practical needs and difficulties of life.

There is, according to this teaching, a means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively; there is a possibility of placing oneself in the midst of it instead of viewing it from the outside in its infinite relations. The object of metaphysics is to lay hold of this deeper way of experiencing reality.

Bergson does not suggest, as we have already noticed, that man should dispense with his intellect, for if he did this the probability is that he would have no intuition at all. But the intellect has a function to perform other than that of taking conceptual snapshots of fragments of the reality which exists in the external world. For there is another reality besides the external world: it is our own personality in its flux

through time—our deeper self which persists. Our own self is more immediate and intimate to us than anything that comes to us from without or than anything we are able to know concerning things which are outside us. What are we ourselves? What are we capable of becoming? What deeper experiences are there that can be gathered together in the depth of the soul? We can only know all this by intuition—by that kind of “intellectual sympathy” by which we place ourselves within the object to the end that its qualities and our possibilities may blend together. The upshot is, that within the soul there is something that can be experienced by itself, however much its materials have come from the outside; and something further that can catch and steer its own duration, something whose nature at the same time, is ever in process of change by reason of sensations, perceptions, and intellectual conceptions. But it is to be remembered that these latter are capable of merging, within the personality, into an

experience which is quite other than themselves. This truth of Bergson's points to a power in human personality beyond the reach of empiricism, pragmatism, and idealism. The first ignores personality, in a very large measure, because of its constant preoccupation with external objects. The second deals with values only in so far as they create a change for the better in our present circumstances and surroundings. The third strings together the "beads" of the world upon an "abstract thread"—it leads us to concepts which are static, and thus prevents experience from realising what is taking place within the soul from moment to moment. Beyond the three, there is possible an experience which is deeper than all this. And such an experience is not obtained by leaving the world out of account, or by ignoring what it offers to the senses or to the mind, but by accepting what is offered and by bringing it to the deepest centre of the personality. In an experience of this sort man has passed from the conceptions

of natural science as these are expressed in terms of laws and general conclusions. If he could not pass beyond this level of science, he might know a good deal about other things, but he could never know himself as he lives from moment to moment. This truth has not only been emphasised by Bergson; it plays an important part in the writings of Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward, Royce, Boutroux, Windelband, Rickert, and Simmel.¹ But all these men are prone to sympathise, in the main, with some form of "static ideal content" of consciousness which forms the norm and standard of all experience. They have a tendency to fix attention upon something which is not the outflow of what is happening within experi-

¹ Cf. especially: Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* and his *Essays on Truth and Reality*; Bosanquet, *Gifford Lectures* (2 vols.); Ward, *The Realm of Ends*; Royce, *The World and the Individual* (2 vols.); Boutroux, *The Beyond that is Within* and *Contingency of the Laws of Nature*; Windelband, *Einleitung in der Philosophie* and the *Präludien*; Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, *Naturwissenschaft und Kulturwissenschaft*, and his monumental volume, *Die naturwissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung*; Simmel, *Religion* and *Hauptprobleme in der Philosophie*.

ence from moment to moment. Their norm or standard is a general concept whose office is to act as a criterion for the content of consciousness as this arises during each moment. And, as against this, Bergson would argue that consciousness is perpetually called away from its own present experienced content with all its wealth of meaning, value, and enjoyment to fixed notions and general ideas, which somehow are supposed to possess a greater significance than any experience of the moment.

This really is the crux of the conflict between intellect and intuition, and it is on this point more than on any other that Bergson parts company with the great idealists of the world. His point, of course, is not entirely new, but it forms the strongest plea that has been raised against every form of idealism which attempts to elevate universal concepts at the expense of the ever-flowing experiences of life, experiences which constitute a reality of their own—indeed, the truest reality—and which include within

themselves the actual situation and meaning of the soul as it pursues its way from the present to the future. To try and catch reality momentarily, as it flows, will give a deeper meaning and significance to life than any kind of attempt to cut off the self from its actual contact with the flow of the cosmos, than any endeavour to convert these vivid experiences into general concepts which are abstract in their nature and alien to the very needs of the soul, as well as to those experiences themselves.

Let us turn for a moment to consider the implication of what has just been stated. In the first place, each of the writers just mentioned is agreed that we can pass from the outward to the inward. All are further agreed that we are obliged in some way or other to distinguish between the concepts of the natural sciences and those of the mental sciences. All are still further agreed that a stage is reached, even justified by knowledge, which passes beyond the physical world as well as beyond the empirical experi-

ences of life. Has not, then, a decisive step been taken in the direction of religion? Probably Bergson has not done justice to the place of intellect in intuition, but he has rendered the greatest service to the world in calling attention, in an original manner, to the need for man to sink into his own inner nature and try to catch the deepest meaning and worth of his experiences in their duration through time. Man, for the practical purposes of his life, is obliged to deal with objects in space; he is further obliged to show the relations of certain aspects of these objects to one another. But it must be borne in mind that the needs and possibilities of his nature are not exhausted when he has done all this. He has still *himself*, as a piece of reality, to take into account; he cannot remain satisfied with himself as a mere object that has relations with other objects. His nature demands more than that which any such empiricism is able to offer him. And he has made great advance when he becomes

aware that he has to transform his first impressions of things into general concepts—that he has to construct mental models in order to be able to read the meaning of the world, and to use this meaning for the practical needs of his life. But he has made a still greater advance when he becomes aware of the presence of qualities in his life which transcend the ordinary, dead-level experiences, qualities which he must perforce use in order to read such experiences correctly. He is now dealing with his personality, and it is probably true that Bergson is wrong in not having sufficiently realised the enormous significance which transcendent ideals have had upon the life of humanity in the history of our world. But he is certainly correct in stating that we can pass from a conceptual to a metaphysical and intuitive level. The levels we have already referred to have to be experienced because the world must go on, and cannot go on without our aid. Opportunities must be obtained by man, if he is

ever to deepen his personality, in order to view and experience the best that happens within the soul; and this best has to be conceived as a reality that outstays time and that subsists in itself however many fragments of objects in space have entered into it. By musing and ruminating upon experience in some such manner as this—by viewing it as a reality that exists and endures—profound changes take place in man's conceptions of the world and of himself. And at last the conviction is born that man has obtained a foretaste of eternity in the midst of the fluctuations of the world and the illusions of sense. Such a change is bound to create a new orientation, a new temper, and a new insight in respect of the things that are presented to the self or are reacted upon by the self. Bergson, and, indeed, most of the great idealists we have mentioned, realise that a new kind of consciousness emerges, which here and now creates profound differences in life, and which is able, in the midst of all the trivialities of the day, to taste some

kind of life which is more than empirical or mental in its nature. What can such a life, then, be but something that has gained the infinite and eternal as its possession?

In conclusion, we may remark that there is nothing mysterious in this faculty. Every one of us has had occasion to exercise it to a certain extent. Any of us, for instance, who has attempted literary composition knows that when the subject has been studied at length, the materials all collected, and the notes all made, something more is needed in order to set about the work of composition itself, and that is an often very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only let ourselves go. This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers all the information it had collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyses itself into terms which could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover; we shall never say all that could be said, and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we feel beyond us, and try to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely

simple. Metaphysical intuition seems to be something of the same kind. What corresponds here to the documents and notes of literary composition is the sum of observations and experience gathered together by positive science. For we do not obtain an intuition from reality—that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations. And it is not merely a question of assimilating the most conspicuous facts; so immense a mass of facts must be accumulated and fused together, that in this fusion all the preconceived and premature ideas which observers may unwittingly have put into their observations will be certain to neutralise each other. In this way alone can the bare neutrality of the known facts be exposed to view. Even in the simple and privileged case which we have used as an example, even for the direct contact of the self with the self, the final effort of distinct intuition would be impossible to any one who had not combined and compared with each other a very large number of psychological analyses. The masters of modern philosophy were men who had assimilated all the scientific knowledge of their time, and the partial eclipse of metaphysics for the last half-century has evidently no other cause than the extraordinary difficulty which

the philosopher finds to-day in getting into touch with positive science, which has become far too specialised. But metaphysical intuition, although it can be obtained only through material knowledge, is quite other than the mere summary or synthesis of that knowledge. It is distinct from these, we repeat, as the motor impulse is distinct from the path traversed by the moving body, as the tension of the spring is distinct from the visible movements of the pendulum. In this sense metaphysics has nothing in common with a generalisation of the facts, and nevertheless it might be defined as *integral experience*.¹

Bergson shows that the generalisations of science cannot constitute a metaphysic which takes the whole of life into account. Such general concepts, as we have already seen, are indeed necessary for the practical needs of life, and have consequently great value. But the deeper life of man is not to be found in them. Man's own inmost experience is thus kept in the background in order that room may be obtained for the

¹ Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, closing passages.

abstract general conceptions which define and explain the facts, or certain aspects of the facts, of the external world. But we cannot surely afford to let the inner life languish in impotence amidst the facts of the world, until it finally withers away. It, too, in its turn must have a chance to experience what is actually taking place within it as it carries momentarily its past and present into the future. Philosophic intuition can be discovered by acknowledging some kind of self-subsistence of the life of the spirit and its content. "Common sense" does this in a measure. Bergson himself shows that by the side of "common sense" there is what may be termed "good sense," which differs from it in important ways, and which forms the beginning of philosophic intuition. E. Le Roy, one of the clearest interpreters of Bergson's teaching, designates "good sense" as follows:

It is a sense of what is real, concrete, original, living, an art of equilibrium and precision, a fine touch for complexities, continually feel-

ing like the antennæ of some insects. It contains a certain distrust of the logical faculty in respect to itself; it wages incessant war upon intellectual automatism, upon ready-made ideas and linear deduction; above all, it is anxious to locate and to weigh, without any oversights; it arrests the development of every principle and every method at the precise point where too brutal an application would offend the delicacy of reality; at every moment it collects the whole of our experience and organises it in view of the present. It is, in a word, thought which keeps its freedom, activity, which remains awake, suppleness of attitude, attention to life, an ever-renewed adjustment to suit ever-new situations.

Its revealing virtue is derived from this moving contact with fact, and this living effort of sympathy. This is what we must tend to transpose from the practical to the speculative order.

What, then, will be for us the beginning of philosophy? After taking cognisance of common utilitarianism, and emerging from the relativity in which it buries us, we seek a point of departure, a criterion—something which decides the raising of an inquiry. Where are we to find such a principle, except in the very action of thought; I mean, this time, its action of profound life independent of all practi-

cal aim? We shall thus only be imitating the example of Descartes when solving the problem of temporary doubt. What we shall term return to the immediate, the primitive, the pure fact, will be the taking of each perception considered as an act lived, a coloured moment of the *cogito*, and this will be for us a criterion and point of departure.¹

It cannot be too often repeated that Bergson and Le Roy do not offer an intuition which is independent of thought and knowledge. An intuition of that kind could mean no more than blind feeling, which would bring us back to a level passed long ago by civilised man. There has been too much cultivation of mind in the history of mankind to allow such a return. It would simply mean unwinding so much of the good and true that have become the possession of man; it would mean the disappearance of the social inheritance of humanity; it would probably reduce man to the level of animal

¹ E. Le Roy, *A New Philosophy* (Henri Bergson), p. 149. Some modification has been made in the above translation.

instinct.¹ The chief aim of Bergson and Le Roy is to show that there is a more genuine, a more real life than that of concepts. Such a life certainly takes the physical facts of the world into account as far as possible in their individuality and particularity. But it goes further. The trees which I now observe in front of my window may be looked at from two points of view. On the one hand, I may in a general manner say that they grow in the same kind of soil, are subject to the same kind of external influences, and so forth. In all this I only state what is common to them all. And though all that is said is true, it is not the whole truth. For when I take each one by itself, quite another set of questions spring

¹ Cf. Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*. Here, it seems to me, the deeper meaning of Bergson's theory of intuition has been missed by the author. Several writers in England have also proclaimed that Bergson's intuition is something which has no connection whatever with intellect! For correct views of Bergson's teaching the unfamiliar reader is strongly advised to read H. Wildon Carr's two volumes: *Henry Bergson* (in the People's Books) and *The Philosophy of Change*.

up in my mind. The individual life of the tree, its own particular function and existence, its beauty, the wonder of its life and mechanism—these and many other similar facts and questions arise. Doubtless, some of the conclusions of science, in the form of general concepts, are present in my statements concerning the individuality, and so forth, of the tree. But the concepts are all subsidiary to the main object of catching that one tree as a unique object which by means of perception stamps its meaning upon the mind.

The chapter may be brought to a conclusion by stating that the inner life of man is to be viewed in a similar manner. His life can move in the direction of intellect, but whenever it does this, man finds himself entangled in the realm of relativity, and so misses the uniqueness of all things—his own life included. But, on the other hand, the inheritance of man's nature does at times point out to him that he, too, is perpetually changing; that he, too, carries within his

own consciousness a life that possesses its deepest reality in its own self-existence and self-subsistence. Man sees himself, on the level of this deeper experience, as a being who experiences and enjoys actual reality, and who is perpetually on the way towards an ever greater realisation of it. Were it not that we have spent nearly the whole of our attention and energy upon the cultivation of the intellect and upon the mastering of the physical world we should have before now developed those deeper, hidden powers which would have enabled us to merge all the particularities of perception and intellect into a unity of consciousness capable of regenerating our whole nature and of lifting it to a higher plane of being.

Intuition is there, however, but vague and, above all, discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. But it glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a

light feeble and vacillating, but which none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us.¹

Intuition thus sees the "life of the body just where it really is, on the road that leads to the life of the spirit." Beneath body and intellect is the presence of this deeper life of the spirit. It has needs which are beyond both, and it is capable of obtaining more and more satisfaction for these needs. These needs never cease, and their satisfaction never ceases. When need and satisfaction, each in its turn, act and react upon each other, an experience is reached which testifies that the acme of evolution is found in the evolution of the soul—an evolution which transmutes and transmutes the objects of sense and of thought, by means of the possibility of spirit, into the deeper spiritual experiences of the soul. It is an experience of this nature alone which will enable man to experience cosmic qualities within his soul, and which guarantee him an ever greater crea-

¹ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 282.

tiveness of qualities of a similar nature; it is experience of this kind alone which enables him to realise the deeper meaning and value of life, religion, and God. When this aspect becomes clear in the life of mankind, a new man and a new world will immediately emerge, and what Jesus meant as the coming of the "kingdom of God" and the experience of "life eternal" will form the most insistent quest and the deepest blessedness of humanity.

CHAPTER V

THE "IS" AND THE "OUGHT"

IN the previous chapter it has been shown that the deeper meaning of the universe cannot be discovered without reflection. And as the meaning of the universe is never exhausted, continual reflection is needed in order to probe more and more fully into that meaning. It has also been shown that man is capable not only of knowing the universe, but also of knowing himself as a personal being who is more than a mere portion of the physical world. In order to interpret the physical world he is obliged to have recourse to his intellect—he is obliged to frame "mental models" of the physical facts which present themselves first to his senses, and then through them to the mind. In this connection he constructs a

kind of "second realm" by the side of the physical world; and had it not been for the creation and further development of such a "second realm" everything outside himself would mean very little more to him than it means to the animal. The whole of our knowledge of the physical world, the whole range of our conquests in that world, has taken place through asserting the superiority of Thought over Things. And this circumstance, indirectly at least, has exerted great influence not only upon man's thoughts, but upon his life as well. The conquests in the various branches of the natural sciences—especially those sciences which are clearly concerned with life—have changed and modified his life in a profound manner. The results of the geographical, chemical, biological, and physiological sciences have helped him to adapt his life to environments amidst which primitive man succumbed or led a miserable existence, and have exalted him, in a measure, to the proud position of "lord of nature."

Now, in all this man is dealing with what *is*. The material is existent in the physical world. All his intellectual nature has been called into play in order to make that material tractable and subservient to the demands of his intellectual conceptions in their relation with the physical universe, in so far as that relation affects man's physical needs. The facts of the world—the being of external things—are objects he has constantly to take into account and exploit in order to reach his practical ends.

But man is conscious that all the demands with which life confronts him are not incidental to the work of dealing with what *is*. Indeed, in dealing with what *is*—in explaining merely that which exists as a thing—he was obliged to seek for an explanation in the *mental* sphere. The relation between himself and the physical world had to be expressed in terms of thought. If this fact were remembered, we should hear no more about materialism. Materialism pure and simple can only satisfy a naïve

mind that is not conscious of its own nature and activity. The relation between man and the world finding thus its final expression in the realm of mind, acquires, under the form of meaning and value, a mental or spiritual nature. Man, for instance, discovers many things which he can use for the preservation and enhancement of his life. But, on the other hand, he finds himself entangled in the things of the world, often with scarcely a glimmer of hope of ever rising above such a condition. He says to himself:

I know that I am more than the animals, yet between us there are resemblances which clearly show that both the animal and myself have only a short span to live, and are soon turned to dust. We are both of the earth earthy, although I possess a little more mind than it does. The wise course for me is to face things as they are and do the best I can with them. I cannot be certain that anything exists besides matter and energy and the refined play of these in the form of what we term mind. Let me use the things which are so richly offered me by the external world and get as much legitimate pleasure as I possibly can. Then, when old

age comes, let me slip off the scene into utter oblivion, and so give room for a future generation that will, in its turn, have to repeat the process I have gone through myself.

That has been the feeling of many intelligent men and women during the past half-century, and doubtless, with the perpetual growth of natural science on its empirical side, their number is on the increase. But it need not be. There is no warrant, as we have seen, for any view of this kind in the deepest conclusions of any of the sciences. We have found how Haeckel had to smuggle in some form of idealism in order to give a finishing touch to his materialistic monism; how Ostwald insisted that energy is not a material thing even in the physical world; how McDougall showed that mind or soul could never have emerged out of a physical body; how Driesch and J. S. Haldane are convinced that the materialistic conception is insufficient to explain the simplest thing that breathes. Even on the intellectual side—even when we do no

more than consider the physical world and our relations to it—we are not tied down to a blind materialistic fate which determines our course before we are born, that drives us along that course to the very end of our lives however evil that course may be, and however much we try to escape therefrom. No, even in viewing things as they are—the course of events as they surround us in the physical and social world—we have a right to affirm that a second kingdom, a kingdom of mind, has made its appearance upon the earth and in the life of man—a kingdom that has something of the spiritual as the kernel of its nature, and is not content to be placed on the same level as the material elements which thrust themselves upon man. Thus, what *Is*, when carried into the realm of the mind, becomes a kind of *Ought*, because it now includes within itself elements which have been contributed by *mind* as the issue of its efforts to understand and interpret the material offered by the external world. Whenever we read any

portion of the world by means of logical thought it is neither the *thing* that presents itself nor the whim or caprice of the individual that decides the result. Neither the world as an object, nor the self as a subject is capable of yielding us what we term *truth*. It is the union and agreement of the object and our understanding that constitutes truth. We are bound to get the two before any progress, on any mental level whatever, becomes possible.

This, on the whole, is the teaching of the leading idealists of our generation. Such idealism had its rise in ancient times, in the prophets of the Old Testament, in Socrates and Plato; and in modern times it has been revived, with modifications, more particularly by Kant and Hegel. In Britain it has been further developed by men such as Stirling, Green, the brothers Caird, F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet, R. L. Nettleship, William Wallace, James Ward, J. S. Mackenzie, W. R. Sorley, McTaggart, and others. In France it has produced a powerful modi-

fication of Positivism in the writings of Renouvier, Boutroux, Bergson, and their pupils. In Germany men like Dilthey, Eucken, Wundt, Windelband, Rickert, Class, Liebmann, Siebeck, Simmel, Troeltsch, Münsterberg, and others have turned their attention to the necessity of an idealistic interpretation of the universe and of life. The same story is found in Italy in the works of Croce, Varisco, and Aliotta; whilst the small countries of the north of Europe have not failed to add important contributions, the chief of which are the works of Kirkegaard and Höffding in Denmark. The works of Lossky and others in Russia point entirely in the direction of a foundation of a scientific and religious metaphysic. In America, Royce, Ladd, and others have published important works imbued with idealism.

The result we have already arrived at is, then, as follows: Although *all* our needs are not satisfied by our intellectual conceptions concerning things that are, still the

work of the intellect does satisfy some of these needs by constructing a domain other than that of the physical world. It is, of course, impossible to enter into details with regard to the teaching of the idealists already mentioned. That I shall attempt to do in another volume which is nearly ready. But it is a fact that most of them are agreed that, in some form or other, a "second domain" of life is reached when the intellect works upon the material of the world without. This "second domain," however, has reference to the external world. And although the work is done by the intellect, still the intellect is often not conscious that it is it which does the work. The consequence is that the inner life of man may be impoverished unless it turns its attention in other directions than merely towards the external world. As Edward Caird states in his *Evolution of Religion*:

Man, by the very constitution of his mind, has three ways of thinking open to him. He can look *outwards*, upon the world around him; he

can look *inwards*, upon the self within him; and he can look *upwards*, to the God above him, to the Being who unites the outward and the inward worlds, and who manifests Himself in both. None of these possibilities can remain entirely unrealised. Even in the earliest stages of his existence he cannot but be conscious of the outward world: it is the first and most natural effort of his mind to throw itself into the external objects which exercise all his senses, and offer satisfaction to his appetites. By a natural necessity he thus, as it were, lives out of doors and becomes a citizen of the world long before he learns to dwell at home with himself, and to know himself as having an inner life of his own. Yet, though this is true, it is certain that the most unreflecting man *has* an inner, as well as an outer, side to his mental existence. He is essentially self-consciousness; and this self-consciousness, however little he may reflect on it, inevitably separates him from the things and beings he knows, even *while* he knows them. The pains and pleasures of his sensuous existence, not to mention anything higher, must inevitably send him back upon himself and make him partly conscious of his isolation from other objects and beings.¹

Caird's object in this passage is to show

¹ Edward Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. i., p. 77.

that the growth of self-consciousness leads man to a conception of the universe and of his own life different from that which has reference to existing things. In other words, man begins to see the need of bringing the chaos of his inner life into some kind of order. Whenever he attempts this he finds himself in the presence of ideas and ideals which give meaning, value, and significance to his life. Or it can be expressed by stating that an *Ought* presents itself before him. This Ought is a conception of life other than that which merely *is* or *exists*. As soon as man looks *within*, ideas and demands which transcend sense and his relations with external things makes their appearance. A "third domain" actually makes its appearance. Just as something from the "first domain" of the external world had to enter, as perception, into thought before the "second domain" emerged, so the "second domain" on its contribution to the needs and demands and ideals of life, and thus there emerges

a "third domain." This is really the nucleus of all the idealism of the present time, and constitutes a fundamental part of the meaning of philosophy. In other words, it forms a revelation of the highest meaning of life and the universe for man—a meaning determined by the various factors: firstly, of the external world; secondly, of the human mind; and, thirdly, of the needs, demands, and possibilities of the soul. This fact, then, compels us now to pass to the "third domain."

We have already seen that there are intellectual demands of life which gradually emerge in the course of man's long history. Our science is a proof of this. Men are now able to explain and interpret the universe and life. This does not mean that a definite terminus has been reached with regard to such explanations and interpretations. We have, indeed, no hint of the existence of such a terminus. The higher man climbs, the wider his outlook upon the universe and life; the larger the problems he

is able to solve, the greater will be the new possibilities opened out to him, and the more intricate still the fresh problems to be faced and answered. Life, of course, does not consist wholly in the quest after *truth*. Periods of *fruition* also occur when the endeavours of the inquiring mind have been rewarded. Even the intellectual life passes through the alternating states of quest and fruition. The quest is followed by fruition, and fruition leads to still further quests.

But in spite of all that happens within such a "second domain" man is conscious that the whole of his personality is not taken up in the task. There is something beside which no one can afford to neglect save at the peril of losing all-important elements of his personality, and, moreover, at the peril of allowing the world to remain where it is. That thing which is meant to progress continually from lower to higher levels cannot possibly remain inert without suffering decay. For the very condition of its life consisted in the activity of traversing

new ground, of attaining new standpoints, of discovering new possibilities, and of extracting an ever deeper meaning from a universe which connects itself in ever new ways with the mind that perceives it.

But men who live almost entirely within the intellectual "second domain" are none the less, in the depth of their own personality, far more than is embraced within such a domain. And unless they look into a still "third domain" they find that an all-important part of their nature withers away. The scientist, the philosopher, and the theologian may have made important contributions to our understanding of the universe and of life from many sides. But if they are the mere slaves of their various theories, and leave out of account the actual moral life of mankind, as that life is lived from moment to moment, and as it has formed great complexes of the deeper experiences of man in all his relations, they have grave imperfections themselves, and hold forth no helping hand to remove the grave imperfections which beset their

fellows. Humanity and all that it embraces must be made an object of investigation just in the same way as physical objects or logical thought. Otherwise the whole realm of man's relations to man will remain in a state of chaos—a state of affairs in the world of morality comparable to the pre-scientific stage in the world of nature. And, on the whole, this is the stage at which the moral nature of man now remains. The "third domain" has not had the same amount of attention paid to it as the two other "domains." There have been periods in the history of the world when great spiritual personalities have appeared, bringing new ethical elements into the content of human personality, and creating new needs in the life of the race. And though such appearances have been sporadic, they have still been the cause of all that is best in the civilising and moralising influences which have affected mankind. As ordinary people we cannot be too grateful for such personalities. But how much greater would the

gains have been if great men in every age and clime had seen the necessity of giving at least as much attention to the ethical and spiritual realm as to the natural and intellectual realms! There are many signs that such attention is being given more and more. The necessity has at last been seen of making the relations of individuals, groups, communities, and nations objects of an investigation not merely in respect of their history but also in respect of their present meaning and future possibilities. This is a welcome sign in the history of the world; it heralds a great advance; and a review of the past quarter of a century would show how considerable is the progress that has already been made. Unfortunately, that progress has been checked by the advent of the present colossal war. And one of the main causes of the war is doubtless the fact that the two other "domains" of life have been taken alone into account, and the "third domain" almost entirely ignored by those upon whose shoulders lies the responsibility

of all the evils of the present. But it is clear to any one who has eyes to see and ears to hear that the first two "domains" are powerless to prevent mankind from sinking to a lower stage of being.

The question then arises concerning the meaning, validity, and necessity of the *Ought* in the "third domain."

When I say to myself, "Such and such deeds, not now done by me, would more fully express my will," my practical consciousness is the one summoned up by my further saying, "Then I *ought* to tend, even now, towards such acts." And the theoretical *Ought* of our judgments about facts, like the practical *Ought* of Ethics is, after all, definable only in terms of what Kant called the Autonomy of the Will. I *ought* to do that which I even now, by implication, *mean to do*. My Ought is my own will more rationally expressed than, at the instant, of a capricious activity, I as yet consciously recognise. The consciousness of a more rational purpose,—of a purpose looming up, as it were, in the distance, beyond my present impulses, and yet even now seen as their culmination, like a mountain crowning the ascent from the foothills,—the consciousness, I say, of

such a purpose, is what we mean in Ethics by the Ought. The Ought may appear foreign, but yet it is never at once the Ought and still something wholly foreign to my own will. Constraint, as such, is never moral obligation. The Ought is another will than my own impulse, yet it is one with my own meaning; and it expresses more fully and rationally what my impulse even now implies. But if the practical Ought of Ethics is thus the fuller determination of my own will, viewed at once as mine and yet as superior to my present capricious and imperfect expression of my purpose, the theoretical Ought of our present discussion of the categories of Experience is similarly related to the theoretical aspect of my present conscious activity. The expression of my Internal Meaning, as I now embody my purpose, has contents and a structure, has characters and relations within itself, and so is not only a "mere Idea," but also has the correlative character of being, as we have all along seen, a fragment of Reality. The fuller expression of my will, defined by the Ought, has, in the same way, its own correlative embodiment in the Real. *This embodiment constitutes my world of recognised facts.* In recognising the Ought on its practical side, as that to which I should even now conform my deed, I inevitably recognise the embodiment of this Ought, in the world of my completed

will, as a fact. The present deed should be, then, at once a conformity to the Ought, viewed as a mode of action, and an adjustment or response to the facts, as the Ought, which is embodied in them, requires me to recognise them. The facts, as real, are embodiments of my purpose, yet not of my purpose as just now it transiently seems, but *as it ought to be viewed*. In recognising them, I limit my present expression of myself through deeds, by virtue of my reference to these facts themselves. That *shall be* now (namely, in my deed), which conforms to the whole system that I mean, viz., to the world of the facts. *To view my present act thus is to recognise the facts as such.*¹

Royce, in *The World and the Individual*, has clearly shown the presence of the Ought as an embodiment of purpose, as a goal that is to be reached. It is evident that such an ethical Ought is something more than mere mental reflection upon the universe or life. It is a mental reflection, and such a mental reflection must be employed upon that meaning. But it is one thing to *know* the meaning of both the universe and life

¹ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii., p. 32.

and quite another thing to *be* that which we know. And, taking now the relation of the Ought to life, we find that reflection upon life may be purely logical, metaphysical, and abstract. Such reflection has great value, and probably it is impossible to exercise it without *being* in a measure what we *know*. Still, in order to *be* what we *know*, we must take the meaning of the relations of men to one another into consideration, and see that such relations determine the progress or the regress of man and mankind. Instead of leaving the meaning of the practical Ought within the realm of chaos and darkness, we need to bring it into order and daylight, and men must be taught that it is in the idea and ideal of the Ought that their true life is to be found. The Ought thus constitutes all the ideals which tend to uplift the life of man to a higher realm. The mind of man must be familiarised not only with objects of sense and with intellectual conceptions, which may be held without fulfilling the

relations of man with man. Attention must also be directed to the need of participating in the life of the Ought—in that larger realm where the Truth is true to all and the Good is good for all. Man in realising this is stripped of the life of the moment, of his impulses as a mere individual, and, indeed, of the particular individuality of his being, and becomes a participator in all the ideals which the Ought has revealed as the life which is ahead of him. We by no means suggest that he is not to recognise anything that is beyond the Ought, or that he is to ignore what is below the Ought—what has helped to its formation. Indeed, when he realises deeper and deeper the full meaning and significance of what is included in the ethical Ought, he will not fail to discern that the Ought is not anything that has been brought into existence like the final bar of a piece of music, but constitutes the first bar, aye, the whole tune. But we shall deal with what is *beyond* the Ought at a later stage in our investigation. Our

present purpose is to try and see what is *within* it, and how its content can enter into the personality and so transform it.

Now, it is clear that the passage from one "domain" to the other involves struggle. The path between the various "domains" is full of difficulties. In passing from the sensuous to the mental, the effort required is almost always great and continuous. With most of us, perhaps, it has involved and does involve trouble. The naïve situation is not left without difficulty, and when it is left there is always the tendency, if not to return to it, still to live very close to its boundaries. Thinking and living in a world of thought, and travelling ever forward on the path of reflection—these things do not drop down upon us like a shower from the heavens. How much more is this true concerning the passage from the intellectual to the intuitive, ethical, and spiritual realm! Here obstacles have to be encountered and overcome—obstacles which are more deep-rooted than those

which bar the way of thought, obstacles grounded in the very nature of man himself, especially in those elements of his nature which reveal his affinity with his past ancestry. The ethical and spiritual Ought allows of no entrance into its "domain" until man leaves behind himself so many characteristics whose foundations are firmly laid in his natural life; until he has sanctified all legitimate things in the light of the content of the Ought and its meaning and eternal value.

The reality of the spiritual life is not discovered in anything which is external to life; it is to be found in life itself. The reality is revealed and, indeed, created by an act of the spirit of man. Such an act must be the act of man's deepest being. But although such a new reality is not to be found in anything external to life, yet the very revelation points, as we have already observed, to something which is over-individual. Even the meaning of reality itself, from its *immanent* side, is something quite other than the natural life and its contents. It is something revealed, but not as yet possessed; it is hard to be reached; and even within the man's own

nature obstacles and hindrances of various kinds are to be found. But the new reality persists in the midst of the hindrances; the man discovers himself as the possessor of a deeper kind of truth than was present and operative in his ordinary life. A cleavage is therefore made between the "small self" and the spiritual life. In the degree the latter wins through the calling forth of the deepest activities of the soul, in that degree does the transcendent aspect of the new reality urge itself upon man. And when the two aspects—the immanent and the transcendent—of the reality are firmly grasped by the soul, the soul moves upward in the exploration and possession of its new world.¹

As stated in the above quotation, the world of the spiritual life, or of the Ought, constitutes a "domain" for man which he has not yet attained with the *whole* of his life. The World of the Ought is present to him as an idea: it is towards the fuller conception of such a World that the nature, processes, and conclusions of human reason tend if carried far enough and made to

¹ The author, *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy*, p. 135.

cover all the needs and possibilities of human personality. But this World of the Ought is still a goal for man's life: it is known yet not attained in its entirety. And, further, the content of the Ought will never cease to grow however much man continues to exercise his reason. However many the Ends may be which he will reach, every reflection on the nature of the Ought and every effort of the Will to reach such Ends will add to the divinity of the Ought and keep it still before him an ideal. This teaching, in some form or other, is the substance common to all the Idealistic Schools of the present, in spite of their differences with regard to the psychology of the Ought, *i. e.*, to the way the Ought has grown up as an ideal and norm for human life. It represents the conclusion of the idealists of Britain, Europe, and America. Indeed, it is not a little surprising how small a change, in the most important respect, the nucleus of idealism has undergone since the time of Plato. As already pointed out, its psycho-

logy has been radically revised on account of the increasing knowledge of body and mind; its natural connection has been modified in recent years by reason of the results of some of the biological sciences. But its core remains. This core has thrown out its fibres not only into all the provinces of the moral and religious life, but also into the provinces of social life, civilisation, law, and many other branches of collective and individual life.

Our conclusion, then, is that there is a reality present in the life of man which is *beyond* the experience of the moment, and larger than any such experience. This reality marks out for him the scope and purpose of his activities, and insists, when man sinks into his deeper nature, that in such a reality alone can he find his true life. This Ought sets small store on man's partial, momentary life, and sets before him a life more inclusive and spiritual. What, then, can such a reality mean but a higher order of existence, for which man

was ordained? It cannot possibly mean what he is *now*, for the Ought points to a content and significance of life beyond him. It cannot mean its own mere history in the past, for *now* it is a whole or totality of meaning and value which interprets history as well as man's own life. The content of the Ought itself is a reality beyond the present situation of man. And when the Ought is present as a governing and guiding principle of the reason and the will, it awakens the conviction that it is the "spiritual band" which fastens together the world's higher gains and values, which will bring a "new man and a new world" even on this earth. It is only what we should expect, then, that out of such a conviction the ethical and spiritual idea of the Absolute, or God, arises. But we shall return to this problem later on. It is sufficient for the moment to know that a Beyond can be brought into being within the soul—a Beyond that constitutes a world of its own. The ideal world of the Ought

is, then, the true home of man. His deeper life informs him that in this alone lies the realisation of all his desires, needs, and hopes; and in the degree in which he brings the content of the Ought to bear upon the fragmentary life of the moment, in that degree alone does he gain a new kind of life for himself, and in that degree alone does the world become the possessor of the very substance of all ethical and spiritual progress. One of the liveliest hopes for the future is the fact that so much of the best and deepest thinking of the world is moving in the direction here indicated. The set-back, which so many forms of the higher life are experiencing at present, is destined by the very nature of things more and more to pass away, and the results of the deepest thinking of great and good men will filter into the needs and sorrows of mankind, and will thus create the beginning of a new civilisation, culture, and religion.

CHAPTER VI

VALUES

It is evident at the present moment that fundamental changes are taking place with regard to the worth or value of things.

Fundamental changes in the actual values of mankind, giving rise to what has been well called "our anxious morality," with its characteristic talk of creating and conserving values, have brought with them what may, without exaggeration, be described as a gradual shifting of the philosophical centre of gravity from the problem of knowledge to the problem of values. The problem of knowledge has itself become, in some quarters wholly, the problem of values.¹

Attention is called to this subject of Values because it has already shed a good deal of

¹ Urban, *Valuation*, p. 1.

new light on some of the darkest problems of human life.

The thinkers who have reflected closely upon the meaning of human life are agreed that it is well-nigh impossible to present that meaning by means of one general conception. Life has at least two sides—the theoretical and the practical. Though the two are closely related to each other, and react upon each other, still it is necessary to see the function and significance of each separately. And this becomes necessary because man is often prone to treat one side with respect and, more or less, to ignore the other. In connection with the theoretical side of his life man deals with Judgments—he attempts, in understanding or interpreting anything, to bring the fact into relation with the dictates of his reason. In doing this he has to select and to reject. Some explanations seem fitter than others. If he is true to his deeper intellectual nature, he accepts the better and discards the worse. In this act, which is founded in the very

structure and work of reason itself, man perceives that all things are not the same; that there are many kinds of differences in the things he comes in contact with. These differences may be in the things themselves—at least some of the differences may be there. It is not our purpose to discuss this matter here, as the problem is one of the hardest in metaphysics, and consequently requires a long and intricate piece of work. Of one thing, however, we are certain. On the theoretical side of life things do affect the judging mind in different ways. Some seem better, some worse; some good, some evil. It is by making such a distinction, in so far as things are interpreted by mind, that the whole of organised knowledge has come into existence. But the distinctions made on the theoretical side of life refers mainly to things that come to the mind without any change in the man's deeper personality. The mind is face to face with the things. It takes its standpoint as an observer of the objects presented to it, and

passes judgment on them. Thus "things as they are" are interpreted. Now, as we have already remarked, things do not enter into the mind as though they were a row of postage stamps of the same kind and price, but, carrying the analogy further, they may rather be likened to stamps of different colour, size, price, and so forth. The judging mind thus assigns different worths or values to things. But these different values, we must remember, are the property of things probably only in so far as the different standards of custom or need have made them so. For instance, we have long ago decided that gold is of more value than silver; the individual now accepts this valuation because by consent or, if necessary, compulsion all individuals have to accept it. The mind has to take certain material as a kind of standard of judgment. Reason has to acquiesce in such a standard, and interpret things in reference thereto. Of course, the standards may be revised when a new need arises, just as at the pre-

sent moment a great deal of "paper money" has been put into circulation in order to meet new and urgent needs.

All things that present themselves to the human mind are judged; some are valued higher than others because they *mean* more for the individual or for mankind, or for both. These things which present themselves to mind are judged according to the needs which they satisfy. But the *theoretical* side of life does not embrace the whole need of man. Indeed, it is the *practical* side which exhibits the most important needs. On the practical side man is only dealing with the things which face him in so far as they contribute towards the satisfaction of his needs. He has not only to pass judgment concerning things from the theoretical side, but also from the side of the needs, motives, and ends which are present within the soul. His body needs certain things, and so does his mind, and so do some deep stirrings of the inner life. Just as on the intellectual level, so also on

this deeper practical level he sees that some things are better than others for the preservation and further development of his life. The extent and worth of the demands depend upon the nature of the End which man has placed before himself. When Ends are all-inclusive, they cover what pertains the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic nature of man. To these three aspects of consciousness there correspond *needs*, and the content of the Ought or End shows what will make life truer, better, and happier. In the words of one lately passed away, Otto Liebmann, "man finds himself the possessor of a logical conscience, the ideal of which is Truth; of an æsthetic conscience whose ideal is the Beautiful; and of a moral conscience, and its ideal is the Good."

Turning to these different values, we find that the logical ideal, or *value*, constitutes a portion of the work of theoretical Philosophy. As already stated, the two aspects of Philosophy are indissolubly connected. Logic deals with something of far greater

significance than the forms of thought. In its objective character it compels us to think the world and life in certain determined ways; its laws place alternatives before the human mind; its judgments imply a distinction between truth and error. It deals in this and other respects with the conceptions of the natural and the mental sciences, and its influence is felt even within the provinces of Æsthetics, Ethics, and Religion. To obey the norms set forth by Thought is something of the greatest importance in the development of personality, although such norms may appear intellectual in their nature. Even if the function of Logic were entirely confined to the intellectual realm it would still enable the person who follows the demands of Thought and the rules of Judgment to construct some kind of valid universe within his own consciousness. Such a person would possess an individuality richer in content than one who had not made the attempt, for he would be able to select and reject, to set before himself Ends—at

least in Thought. The knowledge of the right way of handling the material which is given of itself to man, or which is sought out by him, is a Value: it bestows some power on the mind, and has a relation to the will on an important side. To adopt and follow the logical process in the handling of material requires at every step an act of discrimination between the various Values of the material either for man himself or for the universe. However impersonal the material may seem, it is of importance to the individual because material is often impersonal, not because it has no connection with the individual as individual, but because it has connection with, and is of importance to, *all* individuals. A theory of the universe or of life, if it is true, is true for all and good for all. The individual is thus in his battle for the possession of Truth a combatant in an over-individual struggle. In other words, he is battling for the possession, in this realm, of an over-individual world which will satisfy the needs of his

reason. The satisfaction of this demand of the intellectual nature of man must produce a change in him. Or, as Münsterberg says:

What else does that mean than that we grasp the elements, the parts, the groups, perhaps the whole of the chaos, and hold every bit of our experience before us as something which is to be more than a passing dream, more than a glowing spark. To have a world means to hold up the flying experience as something which is not to be experience only, but is to be itself. And yet what else can it mean than to tell our experience to be itself, than to impart to it a will that it is to last, that it is to remain itself, independent of our individual experience; that it is to aim toward the preservation of its own reality; that it is to strive for loyalty to its own nature. To make the World out of our experience means, and cannot mean anything else than, to apperceive every bit of the chaos as something which must will to be itself. . . . To be itself may mean, finally, that our bit of experience is to be preserved, is to last through ever new experiences, and is to be found again and again. The satisfaction of this demand gives us the Values of truth.¹

¹ Münsterberg, *Science and Idealism*, pp. 38, 39. Cf. also my article on *The Philosophy of Values* in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Session 1914-15.

The same author points out further:

In the field of reality it means that we have not only the immediate acknowledgment of things, persons, and duties, but also the created values of causal, historical, and logical knowledge.¹

The demand for Truth is thus a demand for something *over-individual* that shall *persist*. Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion* and in his *Menschliche Gedanke* has emphasised this point with great force and originality.² His main point is that in connection with the reflective, affective, and active aspects of consciousness the real meaning of the development of personality lies in the conservation and enhancement of all the Values which affect consciousness. Such Values are connected with the physical world and our own physical bodies, but it is now admitted by the leading psychologists of our

¹ Münsterberg, *ibid.*, p. 50.

² Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion* has been translated into English, but his *Menschliche Gedanke* has not yet appeared in English, though there are French and German editions of this remarkable volume obtainable.

day that the Values are not merely physical on that account. In so far as they are physical they act as servants of the spirit of man; they are physical means to intellectual, ethical, and æsthetic Ends. They are used by man's spirit for the purposes of spirit. Thus they undergo, by virtue of the power of spirit, a process of transformation. Their *thinghood* is transformed into meaning and worth. As Lloyd Morgan says:

We find, as a matter of fact, that men and women—some of them civilised like ourselves, some of them with very different social notions from ours—do form ideals of one kind or another, though we may often think them very wrong-headed. These ideals may be classified, the nature of their sequence may be described, and generalisations may be reached as to their mode of development. . . . We are perhaps told that they are the natural outcome of his character and the circumstance of his life and upbringing. No doubt they are: I would not for a moment deny that in the formation of every ideal there is a chain of antecedents, the links of which we might, but often cannot, unravel. I do not deny that every man's character and personality is a synthesis of elements, the stages of which

might be traced if only we had sufficient insight and knowledge. But it seems to me that of this synthesis there is a cause, which for metaphysics is the will of the individual.¹

The passages we have quoted could be matched by what is found in the works of a number of prominent writers. These writers are agreed that the meanings and values created by the needs of the human spirit have not been brought into existence by the material world or by our own physical bodies. Such meanings and values have their existence in themselves; they subsist in their own world—a world of spirit. The proofs of such meanings and values are not to be found in anything that is external to themselves or below themselves. They are, indeed, their own proofs. And their value consists in their setting up Ends towards which the personality may move and, consequently, become a greater and deeper personality. The world at large is not as

¹ C. Lloyd Morgan, *The Interpretation of Nature*, p. 138.

yet ready to understand the conclusions which have been drawn by the thinkers mentioned concerning the actual meaning of the things of the spirit as against material things. But such a step constitutes an all-important part of the education of the race. The world, if it is ever to progress to a higher level of being, must somehow realise that the presence of individual and over-individual Ends constitutes what is termed in religion "the revelation of the Divine." The revelation of the Divine is thus found, on the intellectual level, in the activity of the reasoning mind when it comes in contact with the vast material which at every moment surrounds it. Man's intellectual judgment must take up the chaos of material that is presented to it; it must reflect upon it; it must select and reject; and what is selected and accepted in the light of the ideal or end of the reasoning mind constitutes a Truth. Such truth is to be *conserved*. It contains a spiritual reality which will make its abode in the deeper conscious-

ness, and which will help to expand and enlarge the core of man's personality. So much as this has been made clear by the idealistic thinkers of the present. They have shown that the intellectual nature of man cannot be ignored in his search for the deepest that will satisfy his life. Although intellectual search and satisfaction does not constitute the whole of man's nature, still it does form a fundamental part of it—a part, indeed, which is most intimately connected with the other sides of his nature. To *be* what we *know* is the main object of life. But we cannot *be* without *knowing*. If the desire to know is dismissed, a personality will emerge which is one-sided, and which may leave out of account Values which could prevent the man from drifting into all kinds of superstitions, and from running after all kinds of chimeras. Though God is more than the truths which the intellectual Judgments of man are able to form, He is not less than these. He is those intellectual Judgments;

and whenever man is true to these Judgments, whenever he conserves them, intensifies and furthers them he is dealing with a reality that is spiritual in its nature, and that will lift him to a new kind of world, and grant him a new kind of existence.

But, as already seen, man's intellectual nature does not comprise the whole of his being. Although it is necessary for him to search for truth and to conserve and further whatever truth he finds, still the other aspects of his nature must also be brought to the foreground. He is not only to *know* but also to *be*. Knowing and being are indissolubly related: one reacts on the other. Each of the aspects of consciousness must have its chance of entering into the foreground of life, must have its turn in the transformation, conservation, and furtherance of reality. What is in the foreground of consciousness affects, it is true, the other aspects which are in the background. When the search for truth is in the foreground something of value is

filtered into the affective, conative, and religious sides of our nature. But each of these, too, must come to the foreground, because the whole of reality possible to be attained can never be viewed from any one angle of our nature any more than the whole of a mountain can be viewed from any one single standpoint. So we now pass from the ideal of Truth to that of Goodness.

Truth and Goodness are inseparably connected. They differ, in the main, in the fact that the former may only call into play the intellectual portion of the personality—a portion which is furthest removed from life. It is quite possible to possess some kind of insight into the nature of the ideal as goodness without being good. Just as Judgments fall into true and false, just as some things have to be selected and others rejected, so Ends which pertain to our moral nature involve a situation different from, and better than, the one which we occupy at the moment. Wherever in life

we look we find, over against the ordinary daily life and its values, a *command* that has to be obeyed and whose value consists in its realisation. Everywhere such a command is presupposed, however much the individual may fail to understand the nature of it. This command is termed Duty or Moral Law. This Moral Law is differentiated from the multiplicity of relations in which man finds himself placed from day to day. Life has grown from lower to higher levels by means of individual and over-individual qualities. It has already been stated that a fundamental difference exists between the individual and the over-individual elements in human nature. In the remarks on the collective life of the Community, expressing itself as the Will of the Community, there was seen to be present a reality over-individual in its nature. The history, necessity, and value of this over-individual reality for every individual in the Community, for the preservation of the Community, for its superiority to any indi-

vidual whim or caprice, has conferred upon such a reality an imperative character. It has become an Ought. It is thus differentiated from the reality of the natural world which merely is so and can be no other; it is also differentiated from the reality of the æsthetic world because it cannot be attained without an activity of Will, and also because it is something *to be attained*, and not, as on the æsthetic level, something which is rather "given" than attained, and something which is enjoyed without effort. The self is conscious of this interval between the Ought and the Is even when it does not make an effort to traverse the interval. It is conscious that one of the main values of life consists in that which is beyond the individual, however much the individual has already realised. The self is aware that it is in becoming the content of this imperative that a main value of life consists. This is no more theory, but the actual experience of what the social world presents as a demand and a sanction for man to conform

with. The demand and sanction are here again over-individual in their nature; they are not the creation of any one individual, but something which has persisted and has constituted the actual evolution of the human world. The human world has thus created a reality beyond itself, greater than any individual experience, and which persists and grows though each generation passes away. Such a reality is independent of the pleasure of the individual; and the individual is aware that he cannot withdraw from it save at the peril of losing some of the greatest values of his life. He knows that these greatest values are in the Ought and not in the Is—in what should be and not in what already exists by any natural necessity. The late R. L. Nettleship expressed this truth in the following powerful manner:

I have a real conviction at times of something that is in me and about me, in the consciousness of which I am free from desire and fear—something which would make it easy to accomplish

the most otherwise difficult thing without any other motive except that it was the one thing worth doing.¹ Such a value is beyond the grasp of the mere scientific treatment of the events in nature and in mind.² What should be emphasised in Ethics is not only its descriptive character but also its imperative. This work of Practical Philosophy is looked upon by some philosophers as being greatly inferior to the relation of subject and object of mind and body, and so forth. It is a province which will probably at the start not yield such an intellectual harvest as Psychology, but it will prove of incalculable benefit to the human race, and may succeed in making Philosophy a living discipline to the world at large.³

We now pass to the *æsthetic* side of man's nature. In the remarks on intellectual values we found these to be mainly over-individual, and not direct, personal experiences of the individual. It is true that these Values of Truth are the creations of the mind, and

¹ Nettleship, *Philosophical Remains*, p. 107.

² Münsterberg, *Science and Idealism*, p. 61.

³ I am indebted in this section for some remarks from my article on *The Philosophy of Values* in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Session 1914-15.

express the demands and conclusions of Thought. But it is quite possible to regard these Values as being understood by the intellectual nature of man without being possessed by his whole nature. Man needs truth, but much as he needs it, he needs something else as well—he needs something, however small it may be, which is more intimately his own. It is not given to every man to follow Truth far enough to be able to construct an open systematic view of the universe and life; and it is not given to any man to frame a closed and complete system. So both types of men require their constructions to be supplemented by something else—something which is a deep need of human nature, something which cannot be expressed in words.

We may also assert that when man passes from the intellectual side to the moral, even then his whole nature is not at work. His partial realisation of the Good takes place through struggle, for, without a constant struggle, the Good cannot be realised.

But a constant struggle, void of the consciousness of something that is actually realised thereby, cannot satisfy the whole nature of man, and cannot exhaust the reality possible for his nature to attain. There are things outside us and within us which will not allow themselves to be expressed in logical Judgments, things which mean more than the mere act of striving. In other words, we have to confess with Faust—

“Ich habe keinen Namen
Dafür. Gefühl ist alles.”

The individual feels the need of becoming something self-subsistent in himself—in the form of immediacy. The individual claims, at least in a part of his being, the right to become independent, complete in himself, “not looking for any help or addition, and fulfilling all his desires through himself. . . . Wherever an experience comes to us in perfect fulfilment of this demand, there the world has æsthetic value.”¹ Even in this

¹ Münsterberg, *Science and Idealism*, p. 54. Cf. also his *Eternal Values*.

domain the individual is often dependent upon material from the outside, but the material affects him in a different way from what it did in the realms of Truth and Goodness. On the *æsthetic* level the beauty of nature forms the material; in the social world the unity, harmony, and affection of men and women contribute the material; and in the world of his own inner life it is the equilibrium and unity of the content and experience of his own nature that furnishes the material. The very same material which presents itself may be valued in different ways. A young man's father told me some time ago that, in spite of his son's scientific achievements, he felt that a side of the son's nature was on the point of becoming atrophied. Father and son went out often to the country together, and observed the beauty of earth, sea, and sky. The son saw nothing but his own physics and chemistry in every object, and was incapable of deriving pleasure from any landscape, however beautiful. The father found that

the same material sufficed to give him strength to carry on his laborious work for the coming week in a dingy part of London. The son passed from effect to cause and from cause to effect; the father was able to pick out from the surrounding beauty the bit which he perceived and to find it, for the time being, complete, absolute, and satisfying. And it is the same with the material in all the sciences. It may be handled analytically and synthetically from a logical standpoint, or it may be viewed in its wholeness or totality, as a complete picture is viewed. The Value that belongs to the latter sense is that of satisfaction and enjoyment. How much intellect is present in the process it is difficult to detect, but however much there is it has to be melted into the complete feeling-view which human beings are able to possess. Some are inclined to think that there is more intellect in the process than is generally allowed by many writers on *Æsthetics*, for country people with a minimum of

intelligence are not very capable of appreciating the landscape of their own neighbourhood—a neighbourhood which may draw some of the best artists to it every year in the early summer and the early autumn.

Works of sculpture, paintings, poetry, drama, and music have all had their value in the civilising and moralising processes of mankind. They are over-individual in their nature, but they differ from the intellectual and moral over-individual in that they gain an entrance into the soul in the form of immediacy. They are less difficult of apprehension than intellectual Truth, and do not require the effort which is involved in the attainment of the Good. But they are all-important Values¹ in a world such as ours where but few can hope to attain to a view of the universe, and where rest and enjoyment are sometimes needed after

¹ Cf. my article on *The Philosophy of Values* in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Session 1914-15, pp. 220-22.

toiling hard in satisfying the intellectual demands of the nature or in overcoming some of its imperfections.

But there is grave danger in making *Æsthetic Values* the sole Values of life. Life is meant for alternate periods of effort and rest—effort in the realm of the Intellectual, rest in the realm of the Beautiful. Consciousness is many-sided, and is exposed to a real danger if we make one side of it pre-eminent and ignore the other sides. Something of value is thus lost, and only a partial development of the nature can take place.

But none of the three systems of Values already enumerated touches the whole nature of man. It is clear that he has to work in all the three spheres if his personality is to unfold and deepen. But as he cannot get his whole nature into activity in any one of these spheres, and as only one of them can occupy his nature at the same time, the final quest of life is for a *unity* which embraces the three and includes more than the mere

addition of the three. This unity constitutes the *metaphysical and religious Value* of life. This level of experience means that consciousness now rests upon the final convictions it has gained from the other provinces, and actually experiences them as one. That one experience is a *new experience*. As each of the other provinces of Values was obtained by binding the multiplicity of the material into a unity, so these three unities may become convictions in which the final, absolute Values of life are to be found and experienced. Values of life are to be experienced. As one of the idealists puts it:

That which completely fulfils it (this demand of our nature) is the system of our convictions. Their immediate form is religion. If we transcend the outer world by our convictions we come to God; if we transcend the social world we come to immortality; if we transcend our own inner sphere and link it with religion we come to the belief in providential leading. In every one of these conceptions, the world of things and of men and of duties is developed into a system in which the logical, æsthetical, and ethical demands are unified, in which the

causal events of the universe and the moral duties and the desire for happiness are no longer in conflict. Religion, too, can speak a hundred languages, as the logical, æsthetic, and ethical demands which must be harmonised may vary from man to man, from time to time. But the value of the conviction that the reality in which we live, if we knew it completely, would be perfectly harmonious in the totality of its demands is eternal and absolute.¹

In the religious Values the three different aspects of consciousness come into operation—the cognitive, the affective, and the conative. On the metaphysical side the religious consciousness has constructed a theory of its own relationship to the universe, and of the ideal meaning of its own life. The Values of the three sides of man's nature are shown as the various meanings which the soul has to realise, conserve, and further develop. On doing this depends all the progress of the individual and of the world. The Values are what they are, the world's *determining* factors which enable the mind

¹ Münsterberg, *Science and Idealism*, p. 65.

and spirit of man to escape from the limitations of his nature to a Reality that is more inclusive and more true to the meaning of life than any single, individual standpoint it is possible to take. The final conviction of the individual finds in them truths that have been attained, and still greater truths to be attained; the final conviction, further, finds "Goods" that have been realised, through effort in the direction of the goal which truth pointed out, and "Goods" which are still ahead; the feeling-side of our nature, in its contemplation of what has been gained, which is also an earnest of *more* to be gained, finds itself in union with the cognitive and affective sides. Doubtless the three sides have acted and reacted on one another on the lower planes of experience. But now they come closer together; knowing and being are experienced together as one experience, and such an experience cannot but produce feelings of happiness and bliss. As much as this is even true on the metaphysical level.

At the higher level—the religious—all the norms and standards which were seen to constitute the value of life—the Ought with all its demands—are now found to be realities that proceed from a *Source akin to themselves*. The Values are found to possess eternal significance, and to form the very meaning and interpretation of the universe and of life. The human spirit cannot cease to ask the question, Whence have these come? Illusions they cannot possibly be, for they alone are capable of interpreting the universe and life in *final terms*. All science and philosophy are only preparatory stages in the direction of such over-individual ideals, norms, and standards. It is out of the absolute value of these, then, that the *idea of God* arises.

We shall return to this subject at a later stage of our inquiry. It is for the moment sufficient to state that the idea of God is a legitimate idea: it has been forced on man by the final thoughts, conclusions, efforts, and feelings concerning the deepest meaning

of life and the universe. The Values which we have enumerated could not have originated out of nothing; and neither could they have originated from what was less than themselves. The mind and spirit are then justified in the belief that they have a source of a similar nature to themselves.

One of the chief points with regard to such a religious experience as is here sketched is the need for the *conservation* of these Values. Höffding has done splendid work in his insistence on this need of conserving and furthering these Values. It is by means of this that we obtain the key which opens the door of progress for the individual and the race. In so far as the race has progressed at all, it has done so by conserving its Values and further developing them. These Values have no existence in the external world—they are the ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, which form the individual as well as the collective experiences of mankind. The existence (if the term may be used here at all) of these Values is

in their *self-subsistence*: they are, or can be, actual experiences of mankind. They do not belong to the domain of things in space, although things in space have offered their contribution towards their construction. They do not belong entirely to Time, because they include the meanings and values of what has happened in an infinite multiplicity of moments. Their parts may belong to Time. But now that the parts have become wholes the wholes are timeless in their nature. In the beautiful words of F. H. Bradley, we may say of these ideals:

Our real world of fact may, for anything we know, be one of the last pieces of reality, and there may be an indefinite number of other real worlds superior to our own. On the other hand, our world is the one place in which we are able to live and work. And we can live there in no way except by making our construction of facts in space and time, and by treating this construction as the one sphere in which our life is actual. *Cultiver notre jardin* is the beginning, and it is in a sense the end, of wisdom. No other place but here, no other time but now, no other

world but this world of our own, can be our concern.

Our world and every other possible world are from one side worthless equally. As regions of mere fact and event, the bringing into being and the maintenance of temporal existence, they all alike have no value. It counts for nothing where or when such existence is taken to have its place. The difference of past and future, of dream and waking, "of on earth" or elsewhere, are one and all immaterial. Our life has value only because and in so far as it realises in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real. And yet these eternal values owe their existence to finite wills, and it is therefore only each one in his own world that we can come to possess them. We must till our garden awake and in no dream to gain the fruits and flowers for which alone it is worth while to live, and which, if anywhere there are better, at least to us are everything. If this is not Heaven, it at least comes nearer to the reality of the Blessed Vision than does any stupid Utopia or flaring New Jerusalem adored by the visionary. The fault of the visionary is his endeavour to find, now or in the past or future,

as an existing place that Heaven which is no place, while he neglects those finite conditions by which alone Goodness and Beauty can in any place be realised.

“For love and beauty and delight,” it is no matter where they have shown themselves, “there is no death nor change”; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the Paradise in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is no special region nor any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which is waking reality.¹

Probably no writer of our generation has expressed the transient nature of physical and mental phenomena with such convincing power as F. H. Bradley. He has shown us that the things of sense and even the mental qualities of our individual lives are only partial *Appearances* of the *Reality* that he designates as the *Absolute*. The qualities of “love and beauty and delight” are the highest expressions of the spiritual reality of the universe: they constitute a new world of spiritual, eternal values. The one

¹ Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 468-69.

aim and end of the spiritual life consists in the realisation, conservation, and furtherance of these values, for in them alone are to be found the true vision of the Divine and the true meaning of life.¹

¹ Bosanquet has also emphasised this truth with great power in his two important volumes: *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. Cf. also Royce, *The World and the Individual* (2 vols.).

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF SPIRIT

SEEING that the Ought and the Values which have been now discussed constitute the essential factors in the development of the life of the spirit of man, it becomes necessary in this chapter to deal with some further aspects of the nature and life of spirit.

In order to do this it is necessary to familiarise ourselves with the conception of grades or degrees of reality. Even in connection with human experience such grades or degrees are clearly perceptible. On the lowest levels, man is a creature of sense: he observes objects outside himself often almost without thinking. Myriads of impressions pour upon him in the course of a day, and it is only a few of these he

is able to bring up to the level of reflective thought. Had he not been able to bring some of these impressions to the level of reflection he could not possibly have gone very far beyond the stage of the animal. But every normal mind is able to accomplish such a feat. What that feat involves is unknown in a large measure even to the psychologist. How sensations and impressions of external things come to *mean* anything is a mystery which cannot be completely solved. But it is a *fact* that impressions of things become for the mind something other than things—become meaning, value, significance. And in so doing they become a reality other than a physical reality; they become a reality of mind. Though connected both with space and time, a reality of *meaning* subsists in itself and constitutes a world of its own. But, as has already been noticed, man is not content to stay on the level of intellectual meanings of things: he also feels that there are needs and demands of his nature which require more than a mere

explanation of external things or internal meanings in terms of mind. His *life* feels the need for realising the things he knows. Just as thought is a step removed from sense-impressions, so is the need of life and its satisfaction in the world of ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness a step removed from the world of thought. Even with Kant this truth was emphasised:

But in fact the nucleus of the Spiritual Life, according to Kant's teaching, lies beyond the supposed "faculties"—in his teaching the movement of life was carried beyond the *intellect* as well as beyond *feeling*; and also according to his teaching, when the *will* moves within a higher domain, careful examination shows that by *will* is meant not any special faculty lying alongside of other faculties, but a setting of the *whole man in action*. In the manner therefore in which the Spiritual Life is raised by Kant above the usual division into "faculties," it is able to embrace all the individual provinces of life, and to set all the tasks of life in their right order. Thus the whole range of life even into all its ramifications is accordingly set in a motion in an upward direction, and, at the same time, this outstanding fact of the Spiritual Life of man

makes it possible for him to grasp tightly and preserve continually spiritual demands in all their self-reliance and purity, as well as to detect without any bias, all that is insufficient, and, indeed, unedifying.¹

Just as the life of thought creates a mode of existence and experience different from that of the sensuous world, so thought, brought into contact with the ideals and aspirations of life, creates a reality which, while it includes thought, is more than thought. In other words, such a reality is thought filtered into the demands of life. Thought is now actualised or "incarnated."

The first condition of this progressive independence of life is this: that the life of the spirit, be it by the favour of special circumstances, or means of deep feeling, or by a fervent aspiration, or by self-development or self-preservation, always rises above the usual warfare of elements within itself, and takes a specific orientation, it discovers a common goal, creates an all-pervading atmosphere, so that it finally develops a specific mode of life. There can spring from this an incentive to, and a fertilisa-

¹ Eucken, *Knowledge and Life*, p. 274.

tion of, Thought, so that Thought is driven beyond "mere form"—beyond the mere schemata of reality—to the creation of a reality filled with content; and, at the same time, Thought leads life to an entire autonomy, and to a superiority to all that is "merely human." This is the *inverted order* of existence which obtains in all spiritual life; such an inverted order becomes a progressive independence and freedom over against "mere man"—an independence and a freedom which are witnessed in all branches of spiritual work, and which brings these branches to flower and fruit. Such an inverted order will further work, over against the prior conditions of man, as a rousing influence strengthening and elevating his nature; but it becomes all this only because there stands behind it a *wholeness of life* which seeks its own completion within this inverted order. Thought thereby becomes Knowledge, since a reality which arises out of the activity of Thought cannot isolate itself from the domain of Knowledge.¹

We thus comprehend that human life is capable of passing from the life of sense to the life of mind, and finally into a life of spirit where mind comes into contact

¹ Eucken, *Knowledge and Life*, p. 147.

with, and is transformed by, the deeper needs and aspirations of the soul. Man is meant for such a life of the spirit it is in such a life alone that he discovers his own deepest self; and it is the presence and activity of such a life that has created all the values of the world:

A world of mind and spirit is ever present and requisite if the physical world is to mean more to us than it means to the animal. We are consequently led to the inevitable conclusion that alongside of the reality of the physical world there is another kind of reality which knows and uses the world. This reality is mental and spiritual; its origin and development lie in a large measure in obscurity; but we know that it exists because it has turned the confusion of things into order and utility; it has proved a secure abode for the physical man, and has interpreted his world for him.

It is not a mere speculation but an actual fact that man is more than the things he knows and uses; he is also more than the mental life which interprets the things he knows and uses. Such a mental life is the life of the spirit, and in so far as it is so constitutes a grade of reality higher than physical things. This is the inevitable

conclusion of natural science itself, but the world as yet has not grasped the significance of such a conclusion. When it is grasped, man will discover that "that subtle thing termed spirit" is a reality that is meant to be filled with content other than the things of the world. Man's nature needs *more*, and is capable of obtaining more than is offered by the senses. Our deepest hope, then, does not proceed from the physical universe, wonderful as such a universe may appear to us. Man's spirit is greater than matter and the life of the world, however much that spirit is hidden under a load of custom and conventionality.¹

One of the main points which has to be emphasised here is the fact that man is not content with anything less than the satisfaction of the deepest needs of his being. He is obliged to pass from the realm of mentality to the realm of a deeper revelation of spirit. Until this depth is reached, his life, though it has passed from sense to partial meanings, is still full of contradictions. In seeking for something deeper than

¹ The author, *The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken* in the series *Philosophies Ancient and Modern*, p. 18.

the partial intellectual conclusions offered him he is now seeking for a more embracing unity and for a larger synthesis.

I know of no answer but this, that the perfect is that in which we can rest without contradiction, that the lower is such because it contradicts itself, and so is forced to advance beyond itself to another stage, which is the solution of the contradiction that existed in the lower, and so a relative perfection. If there is a whole which is not finite, and if this whole exists in the finite, the reader will see at once that the finite *must* be discrepant, not only with what is outside itself, but also with itself. The movement towards the solution of this contradiction consists in the extension of the lower so as to take in and resolve its conflicting elements in a higher unity. And this is the reason why the advance consists in greater specification and more intense homogeneity, and therefore, to a certain extent, can be measured by quantity. On this view the higher is above the lower not because it contains a large number of units, but because it is the harmony of those elements which in the lower were a standing contradiction.¹

Bradley, in this passage, shows that man's nature is capable of passing from

¹ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 224.

the sensuous level of existence to the mental level, and from the mental to a spiritual level. It is in the degree in which he achieves this task that he is able to obtain satisfaction for his deeper nature and to unify the world and experience into one whole. He is thus able to think and experience the world more and more as one, as one in thought, and as one in the deepest experiences of his own soul. It is the power of his spirit that enables him to do this, and the final interpretation is given in terms of mind and spirit. The physical world, however, has not entirely disappeared. Man is constantly obliged to return to that world; he is compelled to take into account the physical impressions which the world pours upon him. This is all true. But it is quite as true that a process of *transmutation* takes place: all physical impressions must be transformed by his own mind and deeper spirit; in this manner alone can the universe and life obtain a *new* meaning and significance for him. This is a fact which is so

often forgotten, and which makes people look upon the external, physical side of things as the only real side. Doubtless that side has its own reality, but its reality, when it is received into mind and interpreted by mind, is infinitely richer in content than when it is received naïvely and without reflection. And even richer still is the content of man's experience when the interpretation from the mental side is brought into connection with life—when the individual becomes aware that he is capable of becoming what he knows. As already hinted, this is the deeper meaning which Bergson attaches to *intuition*. When the individual becomes conscious that he can *become* that which his intellectual notions point to as the partial meaning of the world a more intimate and immediate dealing with reality takes place. The intellectual notions melt in the needs and aspirations of the deeper life. And what issues from such an experience is a higher degree of reality than that which is constituted by intellectual

notions either by themselves or through their connection with objects in the world outside.

But such intimacy appears far more clearly within the realm of the *moral* than of the mental life. The individual discovers that he has relations not only with an external physical world and with ideas, but also with human beings. Such human relations give being to a still higher conception and experience of reality than was possible on the levels of sense and intelligence. It is certainly true that in the formation of the moral conceptions of reality the individual has not discarded the activities and conclusions of his thought. But the thought we now mean is now taken not in relation to man's own will—to something that has to be *done* in order that a richer and fuller life shall be his. Moreover, the object of such a moral conception of reality is not the physical world and its conceptual interpretation, but *life* in its final interpretation, meaning, and possibility. The universe then

means for him not only the intellectual conceptions which attempt to explain the world and his external and mental relation to it, but also the Norms and Standards which arise out of the *togetherness* of the life of human beings. Or otherwise expressed, *human society*, as it is and as it ought to be, becomes now the object of his investigation and quest. Such an object behaves in many respects in a like manner with the objects which we discover within the realm of the mind when it deals with the physical world or with the nature and function of thought. Moral relations show the possibility, and even the necessity, of passing from the particular to the general in order that *moral laws* may be discovered, and that a deeper interpretation of any and every object may be obtained. Precisely as the mind holds that laws can be framed governing the phenomena of nature and thought, so can laws be framed governing the relations of individuals to one another. Moral conceptions arise which cover the lives of all individuals, which are good and

necessary for all, and which become Norms and Standards for all. The individual cannot withdraw himself from such meanings and imperatives without, at the same time, striking at the roots of the development of human society on all its higher sides. Such Norms and Standards come to constitute the meaning and final conviction of the life of man in this world. It is towards such a conclusion and conviction that all the factors of sense and mentality have tended.

Now the question arises, What can this meaning and conviction be but *spirit*? It is not a thing; it is not anything that arises entirely from the things of the external world; it is more than an individual experience, because it becomes common to all who follow the path of life far enough. There is no other conclusion at which the mind of man can arrive save that it is *a reality which contains what it expresses*. Yet the mind is not satisfied—and ought not to be satisfied—even with saying that. In looking at reality on its sensuous level with

all its wonder and mystery; in viewing it on the mental level as expressing the meaning of the universe; and in being convinced that it is present in the deepest meaning of life—in all this man cannot but come to the conclusion that there is more than can be sensed, conceived, or even lived and experienced. We may in truth affirm that the reality does not lend itself to exact determinations; it is impossible to state what it is like. It can be compared to nothing, for everything that preceded it and entered into its creation is only a partial aspect and expression of it, and thus fails to express it fully. The utmost we can say is to affirm that it is at least what we sense, know, and live, and, at the same time, infinitely more than all this. The reality is all these as we are aware of them at their best; and as *more* of these are revealed by the effort of the mind and spirit of man, the only possible and legitimate conclusion that can be arrived at is that it is actually more than anything that was found on the

other levels of life. Here, again, we have come across the conception of God. It has been reached by the demands of man's nature, and by the implications of his thought. The failure to see this truth is often due to the fact that reality or spirit is only treated historically and analytically. Men often think that the sole interpretation of reality or spirit is to be found in its beginnings and its modes of growth. But this is a shallow proceeding, for this, if for no other reason, that a reality of the nature we are considering, in so far as it reveals itself to human insight, is never at a standstill; that, in so far as human beings are concerned, more and more of it comes into the realm of the knowable. When we strip reality of the richest content we are capable of knowing and experiencing, we are at that very moment leaving the essential portion out of account, and are dealing with a stage which it has actually passed. This procedure is entirely unwarranted, for the reality is what it is, whilst the analytical method tries to account for

it by what it was at lower stages, by what it is *not* at the moment of experiencing it.

Such, in brief, is the standpoint of much of the idealistic philosophy of our day in Europe and America, especially on its metaphysical and religious sides. And there does not seem any possibility of contradicting its conclusions. The methods which have been fashioned on the part of empiricism are generally blind to every conception of reality which does not lend itself to the senses. Such methods are the product of abstraction, and consequently distort the actual content and meaning of the reality under observation. Perhaps this is due to the fact that man as yet is not able to take his stand upon a reality which exists in mind and meaning, and which has its own self-subsistence. There is no need, however, to pull down the bridge between physical and spiritual reality. The former leads to the latter by means of its contact with the spirit that is in man. The latter, in its turn, passes to the world of the former, and trans-

forms its material into a world of spirit in the guise of meaning, value, and significance.

We are compelled therefore to insist perpetually that such a world of spirit is real—the most real of all the worlds which have been discovered ere it was reached. Such a reality of spirit is not a mere speculation, but an actual fact of the meaning of the content of consciousness—a meaning which describes, explains, interprets, and values all that is offered to man. Though living amidst material things, spirit is capable of enormous removes from the level of the senses.

In a complete philosophy the whole world of appearance would be set out as a progress. It would show a development of principle though not a succession of time. Every sphere of experience would be measured by the absolute standard, and would be given a rank answering to its own relative merits and defects. On this scale pure Spirit would mark the extreme most removed from lifeless Nature. And, at each rising of the scale, we should find more of the first character with less of the second. The ideal of spirit, we may say, is directly opposite to mechanism. Spirit is a unity of the mani-

fold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. The universal here is immanent in the parts, and its system does not lie somewhere outside and in the relations between them. It is above the relational form and has absorbed it in a higher unity, a whole in which there is no division between elements and laws. And, since this principle shows from the first in the inconsistencies of bare mechanism, we may say that Nature is realised and transmuted by spirit. But each of these extremes, we must add, has no existence in fact. The sphere of dead mechanism is set apart by an act of abstraction, and in that abstraction alone it essentially consists. And, on the other hand, pure spirit is not realised except in the Absolute. It can never appear as such and with its full character in the scale of existence. Perfection and individuality belong only to that Whole in which all degrees alike are at once present and absorbed. This one Reality of existence can, as such, nowhere exist among phenomena. And it enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress.¹

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 498. Of course Bradley's meaning here is that the Absolute has an existence of its own. We are the creatures of evolution and progress because we shall ever continue to be dependent upon the *Appearances* of the One Reality—the Absolute.

In this quotation, that which comes prominently before us is the author's statement that spirit is far removed from sense and has a reality of its own. When this conviction comes home to the mind and life of man it is impossible to place spirit in a subsidiary domain, or alongside of the things of the world. Spirit will then be seen as a reality over-individual in its nature, existing and effective in the deepest meanings and valuations of life; it will be seen as the power that has solved so many of the contradictions of life, because it itself is free from all contradictions; it will be seen as the power that has brought life to a partial unity, wholeness, and harmony. But more perfect still than that which constitutes the experience of any single individual is the totality of experience which includes all that is and all that ought to be. In other words, the spirit of man experiences what is over-individual, and this can develop more and more. And *in idea*, the spirit of man has the notion of all that it possesses as existing in its infinity and per-

fection in the Absolute or God.¹ This is the conclusion to which knowledge and life lead if they are followed far enough, and if all the demands and necessities of both are given their legitimate satisfaction. The world as yet is far from attributing its due weight to such a conclusion. This failure is the main cause of humanity's slow progress, especially in the moral and religious life. When this truth becomes clear, with a persistent conviction born of knowledge and experience, then will new qualities suddenly spring into existence; new powers will immediately become the possession of man; new unities and harmonies composed of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Holiness will be realised in human society; a new level of being and a new order of things will be actually realised amongst the nations of the earth. It is in some direction of this kind that the new movement of philosophy and religion is

¹ It does not fall within the scope of this volume to point out the differences between the Absolute and God as presented by Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality* and his *Essays on Truth and Reality*.

tending. Many are the forces at work for the production of this state of things. Great and good men and women are preparing for it, but their teaching as yet is in the possession of the few. How to create interest in the masses for the things of the spirit is our great problem to-day. It is not an insoluble problem. Mankind has been accessible before to the imperishable value of the things of the spirit. If we look, for example, to the beginnings of Christianity, we find such a movement springing up in the minds and hearts of men and women who had received but few opportunities for the cultivation of their intellect and heart, and who were the possessors of very few of the "goods" of this world. Yet, through the life and teaching of a single personality, these had been brought to a consciousness of their deeper personality and its needs. And the history of civilisation, morality, and religion is the abiding witness of what they were able to achieve for their own sakes and for the sake of the world. If ever there was a need for

an elevation of man to the domain of his spiritual nature that need is present before us to-day.

In the meantime, there arises, as modern man with growing consciousness has discovered, a painful situation. Men have drifted from their old moorings, and the new ones which promised the highest happiness do not satisfy. They are conscious of poverty in the midst of an overflowing kingdom, conscious of the absence of a real substance in the midst of incessant activity, and have discovered in the midst of incessant joy and pleasure the absence of genuine happiness. Is it to be wondered at that desire and anxiety should turn again home towards the whole of life; that the question concerning the inner clarification of life should place on one side all other questions and reduce them to subsidiary facts; that the possibility of an inner elevation of human nature—of a self-maintenance on the midst of a threatening destruction of life—should become the most weighty of all concerns? And through such a revolution in the tendency and character of life, the ancient puzzles of human existence, hushed up in earlier times, raise themselves once more with crude and lively energy—problems concerning the deep darkness which veils our Whence and

Whither, our dependence upon strange powers, the painful antitheses within our own soul, the stubborn barriers to our spiritual potencies, the flaws in love and righteousness, in nature and in human nature; in a word, the apparent total loss of what we dare not renounce—our best and most real treasures. But we are now experiencing what mankind has so often experienced, viz., that at the very point where the negation reaches its climax and the danger reaches the very brink of a precipice, the conviction dawns with axiomatic certainty that there lives and stirs within us something which no obstacles or enmity can ever destroy and which signifies against all opposition a kernel of our nature that can never get lost. And if the call to us to return home to the unassailable foundation of our being is heard in no domain more powerfully than in the domain of religion, and to make what we dare not renounce our conscious possession, then the message of religion acquired a totally different meaning. Then religion appears no more as a creation of childish fancy or as a flight into some far and alien world, but as an indispensable helper of man in the difficult and seemingly impossible struggle for a spiritual self—for a soul and meaning of life. Consequently there arises once more, after a long period of brow-beating, an aspiration after fundamental depths and inner convictions, after

eternal truth and infinite love; and in the midst of all the welter of our day appears a new wave of life universal which carries man into entirely other bearings, and which is but the forerunner of a flowing tide big with the promise of a better day.¹

This passage deals with the most fundamental question of the hour. So many religious idealists of the present day see that without laying stress on the life of the spirit there is no possibility for a quickened uplifting of mankind. The conclusions and convictions of knowledge and life are to become once again the main objects of interest and activity. Man is to labour for them, to conserve and further them. Much may be obtained, indeed, more than we can measure, by a consciousness of the possibilities of human nature. The possibilities of man can be multiplied. But there is real danger lest he should consider the development of his own spirit as something subjective and individual. We have

¹ Eucken, *The Truth of Religion* (2nd ed.), p. 61.

tried to show that even on the philosophical level of interpretation there is something over-subjective and over-individual. The Standards and Norms of life are not man's own creations. They have their existence and meaning in the collective life of mankind. It is a fundamental necessity to grasp this truth. But even grasping its meaning is not sufficient. Beyond the over-individual ideals there is a source akin to these. They cannot have arisen out of what shows no trace of the best that is in them. Their cause must exist somewhere in the universe. And it is out of the presence of these Standards and Norms that the conception of God arises. The conception is not something that springs out of ignorance, illusion, or superstition as we have been led to believe by many writers who merely take into account the form of the conception and ignore the spiritual potentiality of man as well as the demands of thought and life. It is to this conception of God we now turn.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

OUR conclusions in the foregoing chapters have led us to the conception of a life beyond the natural life; and we have also seen that even the natural life is far from being purely mechanical. In the development of life on the sides of truth, custom, morality, and religion, something objective and idealistic has always to be taken into account, and although we are bound to conclude that the ordinary events of the world and of life have made their contribution towards the production of this "something more," still we must not forget the fact that this "something more" would never have had birth had it not been for the *spirit* that is in man—a spirit which transmutes all that enters into it. Man

comes to some kind of totality or whole, and is able to increase such a totality or whole by the reception and transmutation of new factors. Something "universal" becomes his possession, and this becomes the standard and goal of his life and endeavour.

With regard to this "something more" that enters into the texture of his life, man is bound to take it into account and to cultivate it if it is to be preserved and is to prove efficacious in the future development of his personality. He is obliged to ascribe to it a higher degree of reality than to objects of sense or to the partial interpretation of the nature of objects which come to him in the form of concepts. He can now view his possession *in itself*; he can reflect upon it *in its own meaning*, apart from the way it grew up, and apart from the individual factors which have entered into the making of it. Such an "ideal content" is more than he is at any one particular moment of his experience. He may hold such an "ideal content" before

himself as pointing out to him what he ought to be. The "ideal content" is first of all an *idea*. But such an idea, if attended to, comes to him with power: it insists that it should become an actual portion of his whole life. We thus see that the "ideal content" includes something more than a truth which can be grasped in its meaning by the understanding; it is also seen as a good which, if obtained, would confer happiness, peace, and power upon the whole soul. The "ideal content" is then more than something to be known; it is in reality something which the individual can *be*. But he cannot be anything he is not without a movement of his inner being towards what he wishes to become. Thus, the three phases of consciousness—the cognitive, the affective, and the conative—are ever present in man's relation with the "ideal content" which presents itself in his deeper life. It is important to bear in mind this truth, for it is only too apt to be forgotten by those who attack

the religious life. In its essential nature, the religious conception is not something which is merely beyond the "ideal ends" which the self is able to hold in front of itself. In the deepest religious experiences the standpoint, implicitly or explicitly, is that some "ideal end must be attained," and it is on account of the presence of such Ends that the whole personality passes to a still greater Beyond. It is the "Beyond that is within" that leads to a Beyond still beyond itself.

Religion constitutes the endeavour to amplify, to enlarge, to transfigure the very foundations of our being, through that power that enables us to participate in an existence other than our own, and that strives to embrace even the infinite, viz., love. The principle of religion is what has been called the ontological argument: let the kingdom of God come—let the perfect be realised! While nature says: *nemo ultra posse tenetur* (power is the measure of obligation), the maxim of religion is: you ought, therefore you can. And religion does really confer on nature the power of realising what, from the naturalistic standpoint, was unrealisable. Reli-

gion pledges, in the innermost depth of the soul, the fundamental unity of the Given and the Beyond, and she promises the gathering inflow of the latter into the former.¹

Here Boutroux shows clearly that religion is grounded in knowledge—in the Given. It is not a belief in something which cannot be verified: it is to religion that all knowledge tends if it is followed far enough. Even the “Given world,” as already shown in earlier chapters has to be read in the light of the potentiality of the spirit that is in man.

Even the “Given world”—what we call reality—is the fruit of the Inner Beyond which tends to realise itself, but this very realisation sets forth the superiority of the invisible harmony over that which is visible: ἁρμονία ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείττων (the invisible harmony surpasses the visible, said Heraclitus. That is why the mind seeks to realise the surplus which is within it, by ways other than those of objective experience and of positive science: by metaphysics, art, religion.²

¹ Boutroux, *The Beyond that is Within*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

To sum up, the Inner Beyond of which we are conscious proves its reality by appearing, in the light of philosophic reflection, as the condition of the essential elements of human life, viz., action, volition, and perception as therein revealed to us. If this Beyond is real, the forms of life which more particularly express it are legitimate and worthy of development. We would indicate, along with positive science, such forms as metaphysics, art, and religion.

And it is fitting to remark that the Inner Beyond—whose reality we have tried to establish, in the most direct way possible, by fusing, as it were, intuition and induction—bestows, once its existence is admitted, a real value upon those methods of inward and even outward observation which at an earlier stage we felt bound to reject as insufficient. They do not suffice; but, sustained by a true appreciation of what lies at the bottom of reason itself, they become instructive.¹

We here see that “the inward witness of the spirit is the essence of religious experience everywhere.”² This inward witness of the spirit is the continuation of our natural home

¹ Boutroux, *The Beyond that is Within*, p. 25.

² Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 448.

in a world of sense and time. But it is at the same time

“The true world within the world we see,
Whereof our world is but the bounding shore.”

Let us follow Ward further, for we can place ourselves in the hands of no better guide:

In keeping with the great principle of continuity, everywhere displayed in the working out of the world's evolution, we have found this faith foreshadowed in the upward striving that is the essence of life. Consider for a moment the development of the senses. The first clear response is to mechanical contact, and we have as the first specific sense, the sense of touch. From this is presently differentiated the sense of hearing, when objects not yet present to actual touch give premonitions of their proximity by the vibrations they set up: hearing is thus the faith of touch. As hearing to touch so smell stands to taste: it is a foretaste that further extends the objective range. A freckle or pigment-spot is all that light at first produces; but when its hints are heeded and the pigmented retina that first arose is furnished by the organism's own prophetic efforts with directing muscles, it exchanges its

passive sight for active vision, and opens out a vastly wider objective world. In keeping with all this is the place of faith on the higher plane where it contrasts with intellectual sight: it is like a new sense that brings us face to face with an unseen world. What does this mean? Let us go back a step. Here as everywhere—in its highest as in its lowest form—faith is striving and striving is faith. The whole conscious being is concerned: there is not merely the cognition of what is, there is also an appreciation of what it is worth, a sense of the promise and potency of further good that it may enfold; there is a yearning to realise this; and there is finally the active endeavour that such feeling prompts. It is through this faith that man is where he is to-day, through it that mountains have been removed and the unattainable verily attained. More life and fuller, achieved by much toil and struggle, an ascent to higher levels not movement along the line of least resistance—this is the one increasing purpose that we can so far discern, when we regard the world historically as a realm of ends in place of summarising it scientifically under a system of concepts.

And how do we stand now? That the present world and progress on the plane of the present world do not and never will meet our highest needs—about that there is little question.

But where in what is, in what we have so far attained, can we discern those eternal values that point upwards beyond this present world? Surely in all that we find of the beautiful and sublime in this earth on which we dwell and the starry heavens above it; in all that led men long ago to regard nature as a cosmos; in all that is best and noblest in the annals of human life; in these very needs themselves that the seen and the temporal fail to meet; and, above all, in that nascent sense of the divine presence which constitutes the truly religious life, and converts faith into the *substance* of things hoped for, the *evidence* of things not seen.¹

Thus we are led, according to Ward, to the conception of the universe as a "realm of ends."

If we were asked what is the end of this "realm of ends" we might answer rightly enough that its end can only be itself; for there is nothing beyond it, and no longer any meaning in itself. It is the absolutely absolute. Still within it we have distinguished the One and the many, and we have approached it from the standpoint of the latter. In so doing we were liable to a bias, so to say, in favour of the Many: led to

¹ Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 459.

the idea of God as ontologically and teleologically essential to their completion, we are apt to speak as if he were a means for them. Those who attempt from the standpoint of the One betray a bias towards the opposite extreme. The world, on their view, is for the glory of God: its ultimate *raison d'être* is to be the means to this divine end. Can we not transcend these one-sided extremes and find some sublimer idea which shall unify them both? We can, indeed; and that idea is Love. But here again we trench on the mystical, the ineffable, and can only speak in parables. Turning to Christianity as exhibiting this truth in the purest form we know, we find it has one great secret—dying to live, and one great mystery—the incarnation. The love of God in creating the world implies both. *Leiblichkeit ist das Ende aller Wege Gottes*, said an old German theologian. The world is God's self-limitation, self-renunciation might we venture to say? And what must that world be that is worthy of such love? The only worthy object of love is just love: it must, then, be a world that can love God. But love is free; in a ready-made world, then, it could have no place. Only as we learn to know God do we learn to love him; hence the long and painful discipline of evolution, with *its* dying to live—the converse process to incarnation—the putting off the earthly for

the likeness of God. In such a realm of ends we trust "that God is love indeed, and love creation's final law." We cannot live or move without faith, that is clear. Is it not, then, rational to believe in the best, we ask; and can there be a better?¹

Now, at the present day, idealistic thinkers point out that the arguments for the existence of God are *synoptic*, *i. e.*, they are, each taken by itself, only partial arguments, and must therefore be taken together. With our increasing knowledge of the human body and its connection with mind, with our deeper insight into the significance of thought, with our clearer vision of the meaning of life and the universe, we are led by an ever-growing accumulation of argument to the conviction that there is a One among and beyond the Many.

The argument drawn from the side of the physical universe is in great need of further development. Although the scientist is carried back from effect to cause, still,

¹ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 452.

on the physical side alone, he cannot discover even amongst the remotest causes any cause different in its nature and mode of operation from any of the intermediate causes. None the less, he stands face to face with a mystery—the mystery how the world came into being at all. What is it that creates such a mystery? What is it that seems to compel the investigator to seek for an explanation which is beyond the realm of physical causation? Wonder and reverence in face of the mystery of the physical universe is not merely present where there is absence of scientific knowledge; it is also present in a far more effective manner where knowledge has reached its furthest limit. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on this fact—for fact it is—by virtue of which man passes from knowledge to wonder and reverence. Men of science in our own day have come to realise that what are termed the Laws of Nature are not merely some of the qualities inherent in things outside us, but are rather mental constructions which

the mind is obliged to form if physical phenomena are in any sense to be explained. And though this stops short of proving the existence of God, it does still prove that the universe exists, in so far as meaning is concerned, for *mind*. The scientist, therefore, cannot leave mind and its meaning out of account in his explanation of the universe. He has to ask the further question, what mind and meaning are. Unless he is able to trust mind and meaning, all the progress that has been made touching the interpretation of the physical world and all it contains comes to a standstill. If we cannot trust our interpretation of nature, as it presents itself in terms of mind, we are on the level of mere sensation, and therefore all can mean no more than it means to the animal. Mind and meaning are a part of the universe, and it is they which inform us what the world is, or seems to be. And to mind and its meaning the world is, or seems to be, more than a mere thing: it is a thing transformed partially into thought. The

thought that thus comes out as meaning, when it stands face to face with any object, is a reality. Such a reality has to be taken into account, for it is the very condition that yields the possibility of man reading the world and life. Is it, then, let us ask, anything but natural and even necessary for the mind to conclude that there must be something akin to one's own mind and meaning in the universe? This meaning is in the mind itself, but at the same time mind and its meaning are parts of the universe. This is no mere speculation, but a fact found in thought's necessity to read the universe in terms of itself, in its necessity to conclude that our meaning of the universe is a meaning which exists in the universe because we are in the universe ourselves. It is true that many men of science do not go so far as this. But the reason is that they continually forget the nature of non-sensuous meanings in the emphasis which they lay on the sensuous objects themselves. The scientific mind has been so accustomed to work upon

objective material, and to watch its changing behaviour, that it is prone to ignore, or to consider as an illusion, the work of the mind which extracts a meaning out of the material.

If what has been stated with regard to mind and its meaning is true, it follows, to say the least, that we live in an *over-world* of mind and meaning which constitutes a reality higher than the reality of the physical world in itself. It may be that such a physical reality is able to exist in itself, without considering its cause or its "carrier"; but it cannot be considered illegitimate to draw the inference that the source and "carrier" of such a reality is something more perfect than itself. Indeed, it may be said that when the mind is most true to itself, and attempts to answer, as far as possible, all the questions which arise concerning its own nature and source, it turns to that source as something akin to itself, but immeasurably greater than itself; for the meaning which belongs to the individual, as an individual, is a meaning which is only

a fragment of what exists in the universe as a whole. The notion of the meaning which arises in the universe as a whole emerges as a conclusion from the individual's own meaning. What can such a meaning of the universe as a whole be but something similar, though infinitely grander, than the individual's own meaning! Of course, the whole content of the meaning of the universe does not unfold itself on this level of scientific knowledge simply because the whole of the individual's nature is not in operation at this level. But sufficient to warrant a kind of Theism, on the lines we have already pointed out, does appear on the level of scientific knowledge. It is not only in the *moral* world, but also in the *intellectual* that something like universal meaning or mind is required.

My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value.¹

¹ Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, p. 248.

The idea of a universal mind and meaning cannot be too strongly emphasised. Yet this universal mind and meaning is not an object of sense as many scientists even to this day seem to think.

They search for proofs of God, as men search for evidence about ghosts or witches. Show us, they say, the marks of His presence. Tell us what problems His existence would solve. And when these tasks have been happily accomplished, then will we willingly place Him among the hypothetical causes by which science endeavours to explain the only world we directly know, the familiar world of daily experience.

But God must not thus be treated as an entity, which we may add to, or subtract from, the sum of things scientifically known as the canons of induction may suggest. He is Himself the condition of scientific knowledge. If He be excluded from the causal series which produces beliefs, the cognitive series which justifies them is corrupted at the root. And as it is only in a theistic setting that beauty can retain its deepest meaning, and love its brightest lustre, so these great truths of æsthetics and ethics are but half-truths, isolated and imperfect, unless we add to them yet a third. We must

hold that reason and the works of reason have their source in God; that from Him they draw their inspiration; and that if they repudiate their origin, by this very act they proclaim their own insufficiency.¹

We shall now pass to another aspect in nature and in the moral life which leads to the idea of God. During the past few years the idea of Teleology has played no small part in some of the branches of the physical sciences as well as in philosophy. Even Nature itself is conceived as working towards Ends, though in the inorganic world, and up to a certain level also in the organic, it is unconscious of those Ends. The very fact of the continued existence of the physical universe is a witness to the fact that it has the power—whatever that power may be—to continue to exist and to transform itself. When the plant-world is reached we find an actual evolution, *e. g.*, “first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.” It is agreed amongst men of science that

¹ Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, p. 273.

the myriad transformations which are observed in the world to-day have arisen from one or a few primeval forms. Much evidence has accumulated during the present generation in proof of this belief. It is agreed that Nature is capable of doing work and of changing. The evolutionary process is a history of change bringing something *new* into explicit existence. This *new*, measured from the standpoint of *mind*, is more akin to *mind* on every fresh ascending level. It moves more and more in the direction of self-conscious thought, until finally man emerges—a being capable of looking around, behind, and before.

There is no manner of doubt as to this fact. But what it is that brings about the change, and that enables something *new* to come into being, still causes sore perplexity. Amongst the multitude of opinions on this subject, there are approximate agreements on certain points. Most scientists are agreed that matter and life are qualities touching which it cannot be dogmatically asserted that

the latter has arisen out of the former solely by means of mechanical, chemical forces. Even below consciousness there is a definite sense in which we may speak of Teleology.

The foundations of "teleology"—really individuality—in the universe are far too deeply laid to be explained by, still more, to be restricted to, the intervention of finite consciousness. Everything goes to show that such consciousness should not be regarded as the source of teleology, but as itself a manifestation, falling within wider manifestations, of the immanent individuality of the real. It is not teleological, for the reason that as a finite subject of desire and volition it is "purposive." It is what we call purposive because reality is individual and a whole, and manifests this character partly in the short-sighted and electric aims of finite intelligence, partly in appearances of a far greater range and scope. The large-scale patterns of history and civilisation are not to be found as purposes within any single finite consciousness; the definite continuity and correlation of particular intelligent activities, on which the teleological character of human life as a whole depends—the "ways of Providence"—are a fact on the whole of the same order as the development of the solar system or the appear-

ance of life upon the face of the earth. It is impossible to attribute to finite consciousness as agents, the identity at work within finite consciousness as a whole. This identity is exhibited in a development which springs from the linked action of separate and successive finite consciousness in view of the environment. Every step of this development, though in itself intelligent and teleological, is in relation to the whole unconscious; and the result is still a "nature," through a second and higher nature. This principle is all-important, and holds throughout all levels of being. I am content to stake my whole contention upon it, and if it can be overthrown, or if I have misconceived the relation of anti-naturalistic writers to it, I shall be most eager to be set right.¹

Bosanquet goes on to emphasise the two parts of his contention.

There is teleology below consciousness. The intelligence of man and of animals that can be called intelligent does not, as I see the matter, sustain or conduct their bodily life. To say that all vital responses have been inherited from volitional or quasi-volitional behaviour is,

¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 152.

to my mind, doubtful in fact, but, in any case, an evasion of the point of principle.

In the first place, if something analogous to volition moulded the structure of the body in earlier phases of evolution, it never moulded them by any conscious wisdom in the mind of that phase; it followed, almost blindly, the determining of a deeper wisdom, which lay hidden in the general structure of the environment. The denial of teleological significance to natural selection is typical of the contention I am arguing against.

In the second place, whatever mind may have done in the past for our bodily structures and responses, this cannot come into court when we ask what part it plays to-day. Man's mind and purposes presuppose, accept, and are founded on, his actual body; the plant-mind, if there is one, presupposes and accepts the plant-form. Say here, as was said of man, that mind is present from the beginning; still it is present in forms so elementary that they must on the whole be moulded rather than mould. The orchid, as I have said above, could have no mind that contrives its fertilisation any more than man has a mind which could teach him to swallow or digest, or could choose the place or century of his birth. Everywhere finite consciousness makes its appearance, so far as this is obvious and unmistakable, at a relatively

high level, focussing and revealing the significance of a huge complication of mute history and circumstance behind it and surrounding it.¹

This passage gives us an instance of what the "nature of things" is capable of achieving. All that has been done even for man with regard to his physical life, and, indeed, with regard to much of his psychical life, has been done by nature. There is here a teleology which is unmistakable, and though we may not yet be able to ascribe consciousness to nature still one cannot be blind to the presence and working of a kind of "directivity" in the physical process itself. Everything on the face of this earth has been accomplished by a power that is beyond our comprehension, a power that, to say the least, must be an object of wonder and awe. Bosanquet has laid stress upon this aspect in a manner that carries Realism into quite new regions, and that even re-

¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 152.

conciles it with Idealism. This aspect of physical things and the part which they play in the preservation of all life cannot be left out of account even when man is aware of the experiences which take place on the levels of knowledge and religion.

We do not get to any heaven by renouncing the Mother we spring from; and when there is an eternal secret for us, it is best to believe that Earth knows, to keep near to her, even in our utmost aspirations.¹

“Our earth we have seen
Beneath and on surface, her deeds and designs;
Who gave us the man-loving Nazarene,
The martyrs, the poets, the corn, and the
vines.”²

The same is true concerning the stars—
“the lustrous people of the night.”

“The issues known in us, our unsolved solved:
That there with toil Life climbs the self-same
Tree.”

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¹ George Meredith, *Lord Ormont*, ch. xiv.

² *Ibid.*, *The Empty Purse*.

“So may we read, and little find them cold:
Not frosty lamps illumining dead space,
Not distant aliens, not senseless Powers.
The fire is in them whereof we are born;
The music of their motion may be ours.
Spirit shall deem them beckoning Earth and
voiced
Sisterly to her, in her beams rejoiced.
Of love, the grand impulsion, we behold
The love that lends her grace
Among the starry fold.
Then at new flood of customary morn
Look at her through her showers,
Her mists, her streaming gold,
A wonder edges the familiar face;
She wears no more that robe of printed
hours;
Half strange seems earth, and sweeter than her
flowers.”¹

There cannot be a doubt that a return
to Nature, not only for her Beauty but
also for her Truth, is at hand.

“She has been slain by the narrow-brain,
But for us who love her she lives again.

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¹ George Meredith, *Meditation under Stars*.

She can lead us, only she,
Unto God's footstool, whither she reaches;
Loved, enjoyed her gifts must be;
Reverenced the truth she teaches."

We must not infer that such ideas are merely due to an imaginative contemplation of the physical universe; they issue likewise from the deepest reflections of the thinker. The verses show that the author of all being is not something that was momentarily immanent in the universe, and afterwards became transcendent. The author of all is immanent in the universe now, and ever has been, in the very same sense as in simplest beginnings.

The conclusion reached by many eminent men of science of the present day with regard to the nature of the universe is similar to that of George Meredith. Some of the writers we have already mentioned in the realm of Biology have laid great stress on the presence of a non-mechanical element in life. We have already dealt with this point in the chapter on *Body and Mind*.

The verdict of these writers proclaims the presence of something in the long history of the evolutionary process besides Matter—something that moulds Matter into Life, and finally into Mind and Spirit. The Power to which we must refer is not an object which lends itself to any of the senses, but the senses enable us to perceive the work of such a Power in Matter. It must be something non-material; it must be something that is more akin to Mind than to Matter; it must be something of the same nature as the highest that emerges in the evolutionary process. Though such a Power is not subject to exact determination on the physical level, still it is the creator and preserver of all things. So much as this is certain. What then can it be but the very nature of things? What other term can we use to designate such a Power save the Absolute or God? We are driven to do this because the very same Power appears in sharper outline in human history, in the life of reason, and in the workings of the soul.

To these aspects we shall now turn. Let us again take Bosanquet as our guide.

And with the mention of history, and the time and place of a man's birth we come to Teleology above finite consciousness. In history, or in what is greater than history, the linked development of art or ideas and religions, the principle of a teleology beyond though exhibited in finite consciousness is clear and unambiguous. It is not finite consciousness that has planned the great phases of civilisation, which are achieved by the linking of finite minds on the essential basis of the geological structure of the globe. Each separate mind reaches but a very little way, and relatively to the whole of a movement must count as unconscious. You may say there is intelligence in every step of the connection; but you cannot claim as a design of finite intelligence that never presented itself in that character to any single mind. The leader of a Greek colony to Ionia in the eighth or ninth century B.C. was certainly paving the way for Christianity; but his relation to it, though in a higher way of working, was essentially that of a coral insect to a coral reef. Neither Christianity nor the coral reef was ever any design of the men or the insects who constructed them; they lay

altogether deeper in the roots of things; and this, as I hold, really carries with it the conclusion which in principle must be accepted about evolution. Nothing is probably due to finite mind, as such, which never was a plan before any private mind.¹

The contrast, then, of mechanism with teleology is not to be treated as if elucidated at one stroke by the antithesis of purposive consciousness and the reactions of part on part. It is rooted in the very nature of totality, which it regards from two complementary points of view, as an individual whole, and as constituted of inter-reacting members. Of the two points of view, it is impossible for either to be entirely absent. Assuming this impossibility to be possible, a total failure of mechanical intelligibility would reduce the spiritual to the miraculous, the negation of all spirituality, as a total failure of teleological intelligibility would reduce individuality to incoherence, and annihilate mechanism. But teleology, being most usually thought of *par excellence* or in abstraction, may more easily be supposed to be absent than mechanism, which must attend any interrelation at all. "Understanding without Reason is something, Reason without under-

¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 154.

standing is nothing" (*Hegel's Life*, Rosenkranz, p. 546).¹

Bosanquet keeps close to the mechanical yet he does

not mean to treat consciousness or the self as a by-product or an accessory; but it is becoming more and more obvious that, *qua* the developed finite mind, they must be regarded as appearances which come on the top of a great deal that must go before them.²

It is not necessary to think of mind arising from something entirely apart from matter. In so far as physical life is concerned an immaterial agency as well as a material one may have the closest possible connection. Still this does not mean that everything that now exists in the world of mind has merged from something that had no mind at all. Bosanquet's point of view is that the whole system of physical things is operative in the production of anything psychical or mental. He does not, however, deny the presence of

¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 155.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

an *immaterial* factor present in the physical system. Such a factor is admitted by all psychologists. Stout says:

Matter, as perceived and conceived by common sense and science, is essentially a phenomenon; and *phenomenon* simply means *appearance* or *presentation*. There can be no appearance or presentation apart from a subject to which an object appears or is presented. Hence the nature of matter as known is constituted by its being known, or at least knowable. On the other hand, it is equally certain that the *existence* of what is known to us as matter does not depend on our knowledge of it. Only its appearance as material phenomena is dependent on our sensitive experiences and the elaboration of these by thought. Hence it follows that, so far as it exists independently of its presentation to a cognitive subject, it cannot have material properties, such as extension, hardness, colour, weight, and the like. It is an agency which is an essential condition of material phenomena, but is not itself a material phenomenon. Thus we are led by a quite different line of investigation to the same conclusion which was suggested by the relation of conscious process to nervous process. The world of material phenomena presupposes a system

of immaterial agency. In this immaterial system the individual consciousness originates. To it, in some way, the sensational experiences are due which form the basis of our knowledge of the mental world. It is on it the individual consciousness acts when it produces changes in the material world. All this is possible because the system of immaterial agency is identical with what we know as matter, in so far as matter exists independently of its possible presentation to a perceiving subject. This theory has been purposely stated in a vague form. There are varying views as to the nature of the system of immaterial agency. Some say that is will, others that it is absolute thought, others that is unknowable; in any case, the student should guard against the assumption that the immaterial system is a sort of repetition of the material system, involving the same sort of interactions, and similar distinctions and relations of its parts.¹

If we once take our stand on the conclusions reached by such teachers as Bosanquet and Stout we are obliged to grant consciousness a reality of its own, however closely related it may be to the material

¹ Stout, *Manual of Psychology* (2nd ed.), p. 54.

world and to the body. In spite of such relations—and these are conceived in different ways by these two teachers—they agree in showing that *now* there is an all-important sense in which consciousness exists in itself—in its own meanings and values. It has already been shown that it must read the world and its own content by means of meaning, value, and experience. In other words, the world and the *parts* which constitute a *totality* of experience have to be read in the light of the meaning and value of such a totality. The very structure of the knowing mind remains unfulfilled as long as the parts are not centred in some whole of meaning and value. The final meaning of the universe and of life is then expressed in terms of the conclusions and convictions of the knowing mind. But the knowing mind, in so far as it deals with the physical universe and the experience already attained, is not the sole reality which consciousness possesses. As already shown, the meaning of the

universe, as it expresses itself in the highest ideas of the continually growing mind, also points to a situation which is *beyond* what is in the physical universe and *beyond* any *present moment* of consciousness. This is especially so in that region of consciousness which deals with the conceptions of the Good and the Beautiful. The trans-subjective character of such conceptions constitute, for every reflective mind, the very End which alone seems to be the destination of the deepest experience of man. Such conceptions may be present in the mind without, at the same time, having any power over the will: in ordinary language, the ideas may be present in the head without having any influence on the heart. It is a common experience that many things may be known without our being, through and through, the things that are known. For although consciousness is a unity, still there is a sense in which the whole of the content of the unity may not be operative in the same degree. The cognitive aspect

may be strong, and the affective and conative weak, and the same is true of the affective and conative in their turn. But at the deepest experience of life, when man becomes aware of the truth of his own relation to the universe and to himself, he becomes aware at the same time of an End which is good, and of the need of efforts on his own part to reach such an End. Every reflective mind will admit that something of this kind does actually happen at the most intense moments of life. Thus the three aspects of consciousness are at work, at times alternately and at other times conjointly and unitedly in the form of something like a new, deep kind of feeling which seems to be the resultant of all the factors of one's nature gathered into a unity.

When such experiences occur, their immanent and transcendent characters blend together, and produce a peculiar kind of experience. But *after* the experience man is able to distinguish the objective and the subjective factors which were present in

the unique experience. When this is done, however, the experience has vanished. This is not because the truth-aspect is not present in the deeper total-experience, but because the truth-aspect of things is not all-inclusive. The same may be said of the Good and the Beautiful taken each by itself. The Good may mean no more in the beginning of the experience than an Idea, possessed by the intellect, of the truth that is discovered as resulting from man's connection with the world. But as this truth becomes a personal matter it reveals its necessity and relation to the individual's moral nature, and appears as something which ought to be attained by the individual himself. If the two aspects here presented become strong enough, the third aspect—the will—is set in motion in order to reach the desired goal presented by the other two aspects. When such a goal is reached, satisfaction is attained by man's nature; changes are actually taking place in his life; Truth and the Idea of the Good have led him to a partial realisation of

both. As a result he cannot possibly do other than consider the experience he has actually passed through as constituting the very nature of the universe and of life; and he cannot refuse to ascribe to such experience and the ideals which, in its turn, it gives rise to, a Reality which includes all that he possesses in that experience and infinitely more than he possesses.

It is impossible for us to escape such a conclusion. It is to such a conclusion that all the lower factors of the external world and of life have co-operated. The conception of God is more than an hypothesis or "over-belief": it is partly a *fact* to which knowledge and life lead; and such a fact is only the sequel of what is most significant in the experience when it becomes convinced that a process of the very same nature, revealing still greater things to come, is capable of going on. For the farther such an experience travels, the deeper will its convictions become with regard to the *objective* character of the

Reality that is reflected in Truth, Goodness, Beauty, and Holiness within the soul.

Of course, no exact scientific determinations of the Godhead are to be made. And there is a very good reason why they cannot be made. To reduce the Godhead to an object among other objects is, in the last resort, to wish to barter something better for something worse, something greater for something less. The Godhead, on the one hand, is to be found in the ever-deepening total-experiences gained by the whole nature of man; and, on the other hand, the God is the *More* which this total-experience sees and feels as a *Beyond* that is in front of itself. An increasing number of religious and philosophical writers of the present day move in such a region as this. It augurs well for the future that, once again, the possibilities and necessities of man's nature are beginning to obtain their due attention. And while, on the one hand, man's nature is shown to be capable of reaching Ends which lie beyond the physical world or the mere

physical and ordinary needs of the hour, on the other hand, such Ends—constituting as they do the revelation of the Godhead in the total-experiences of man's nature—are the earnest of the dawning of a still greater revelation. For they it is, and they pre-eminently which point to the one great Source, in whom, and by whom, everything lives and moves and has its being.

CHAPTER IX

RELIGION AND CHRISTIANITY

IN the previous chapter the conclusion was reached that the actual presence of the Ought as an ever-growing reality was the most fundamental and far-reaching fact in human life. Life robbed of the Ought loses its aspiration towards higher things, and is tied down to the perpetual flux of the experience of the moment. We have seen that man is *more* than all this—that he is capable not only of perceiving portions of the external world, but is also able to deal with the material after it has entered consciousness and after it has started upon the new course prescribed by his own actual experience. He is able to select out of the chaos of consciousness qualities which further the spiritual development of his

life, and he is also able to reject material which is injurious to his life.

Now, all the material that is helpful he conceives as having *value*—as constituting likewise of the very meaning of the universe and life when taken as a whole. The process of selection and rejection continues throughout life. In course of time what is selected and acknowledged as an *Ought* forms the nucleus of religion, and, at the same time, forms the “atmosphere” in which man’s deepest life finds its sustenance. He attaches profound importance to this Ought, and puts forth all his efforts to possess, for once and for all, the very meaning, value, and experience of what he *knows*. He is, by the very nature of the Ought, compelled to see that the Ought is not merely subjective but objective as well. Though this fact is not an objectivity in space nor is included in moments of “clock-time,” still it is none the less objective. The Ought is present as idea and ideal in his consciousness, but it may be so without the

individual actually being what he knows. And, indeed, what enters into his personality, or self, can never do more than approximate towards the trans-subjective ideal which is present in consciousness. And thus, as already shown, he is led to the conception of the infinity of the Ought and to its background—God. The Ought constitutes for him the meaning and value of life and the universe. And when the boundless importance of these things is recognised, life is for ever consecrated to the establishment of relations between himself, on the one hand, and the Ought and God, on the other. The essence of Religion consists in this establishment of relations between the self and its *over-world*. This common kernel is to be found in all the religions of the world. There is a sense in which they all attempt to raise the human to the level of the divine. Religions vary in regard to the manner in which this attempt is made, as well as in regard to the nature of the Ought which has grown up in the form

of civilisation, culture, and morality. And religions vary still more in their *intellectual* conceptions of a *spiritual* fact. Such different standpoints of conceiving things makes a difference in the nature of the Ought and of our conception of God. Indeed, it may be said that, in one sense, we fashion our Ought and God in the image of the history, life, and ideals of the individual and the nation. This fact is often forgotten, but religious teachers of the present are coming to see that there is an evolution, for good or for ill, in religion and religious conceptions.

The failure to see the relation of the Ought and God to the life and relations of the individual and of society has been the cause of so many of the disasters of the world and of the tragedies into which mankind has been plunged. It has often been taught that the ideals of life have no meaning save in so far as the present life is concerned. Religion has often been conceived as meaning something quite different from the highest that man is able to conceive and place

before himself as his goal; and this highest has not been considered as possessing any fundamental relation with the meaning and background of the Ought—God. But at last we are discovering that God is *this highest*, however much more He may be. And to know how much more than this He is, is best experienced by knowing what *this* is. We are coming to see at least that a religion which cannot stand the difficult tests of the vicissitudes of time cannot be genuine: it cannot endure unless it takes into account values, unless it conserves all that is best in the individual and collective effort of mankind as this is revealed in everything empirical, idealistic, and moral. In order to acquire this and consequently to possess a genuine religion mankind is summoned to-day to give up once for all a conception of a being who sits in the heavens and has nothing to do with the work and progress of the world except being a passive spectator of its tragedies. The Ought is divine, and to that fact we must cling; and clinging to it

we shall be able to obtain relations with the Ought and with Him who not only includes the Ought but who, as well, is beyond it in the form of an infinity of meaning and blessedness. Mankind in the meantime has to hold fast to the *intermediate* reality that lies between it and the Godhead, and from this height possess the faith that all that is *beyond* even this is infinitely greater than man has yet dreamed.

But, on the other hand, man is to see that such a life, though less than the complete life of the Absolute, is still more than the ordinary life which the world pursues along the lines of least resistance, and with never a thought of passing beyond its meanness and smallness.

In all this we conclude then that man is capable of becoming the possessor of an over-world, and can gain a conviction that such an over-world includes the inmost meaning, value, and significance of his life. Or, otherwise expressed, the *Is* can be raised to the level of the *Ought*, and the *Ought*

can be raised to the *Godhead*. When such an *Ought*, in its turn, becomes an *Is*—becomes by habit something on the ordinary level—a still greater Ought appears as the goal of life. And, as has been noticed, the Ought is conceived as proceeding from a source akin to itself—a source complete and perfect, holy and divine. The meaning of life consists in realising each Ought as it presents itself; in establishing it in the world in order that it may raise and purify every earthly element and every social relation. But the background of the Ought is the Godhead. No other conclusion is possible to man, because it leads to endless contradictions if we assign to the Ought an origin in what is *below* itself. It is in the Ought that the Godhead, most of all, reveals Himself, but the existence of the Godhead, as being the creator and sustainer of the Ought, has to be perpetually affirmed by man in order that the Ought may obtain an eternally objective as well as a subjective meaning.

This aspect, which we have here touched

upon, forms the nucleus of the Christian Religion. Such an experimental realisation of the Ought was witnessed in the life of the Founder of Christianity. The early Christians were aware of this fact, and possessed the faith that something similar, on a smaller scale, could take place in themselves. The life and teaching of Jesus were actual proofs to them of the possibility of living in a spiritual world in the very midst of all the contradictions, complexities, and even calamities of the present world. In this way the disciples of the Master, and the Christians of the two or three following generations, looked upon life as being capable, by means of the revelation that comes from on high, of bestowing a peace and bliss which the ordinary things of life could never give. It made no difference that they were not able to understand the psychology of the Ought or the Logos. They were convinced that the reality of an over-world could become theirs through faith. It is remarkable, in the life of the writers of

the New Testament, how small a part the miraculous and the mythical played in their conceptions and experiences of religion. Religion to them all was the activity of the whole nature in the direction of what was beyond and above itself. And faith signified no less than a firm, clear, and constant attitude of devotion towards all that was true, good, and holy. And when the true, the good, and the holy were experienced as realities which proceeded from the Divine, peculiar, fundamental changes took place in the soul, and these new qualities were lived out in the world.

A great deal of work has been done in our generation to differentiate between the *substance* of Christianity and the *form of its existence*. This has often been done by men who had nothing but the critical faculties to recommend them, and their results tended to produce more harm than good. And it is necessary to utter a word of warning in this respect even to-day. If more time had been given to the realisation

of the deeper meaning of Christianity as an experimental religion of the soul, all accretions which are merely intellectual in their nature would have been forgotten by the world and a new intellectual "clothing" would have been given to the Christianity of to-day. All the results of science, philosophy, and history can be accepted as the clothing of Christianity, for all these leave untouched the *nucleus* of the Christian Religion. That nucleus has ever been, ever is, and ever will be the same. And Christianity by means of this nucleus is capable of granting man what he needs. The essence of the nucleus is the eternal fact revealed in the life of the Founder—the union of the Divine and the Human. This message of Christianity, exemplified in the life and death of the Founder, is the final solution to the riddles of the universe and of life. There is no possibility of saying anything further on the subject. God was revealed in Christ, and this glad message has had a history of nearly two thousand years, and

has healed the wounds of humanity in every age and every clime. The life of the Master is a model of what human life ought to be. But our lives will not become what they ought to be unless we place the powers which we possess in activity. When this is done—and how we have tried to show in this book—a new humanity and a new world will immediately arise. When knowledge passes into *love* the solution of the problem of life is discovered. And it must not be forgotten that Christianity is something to be *done*—it is a perpetual *deed*—and not merely intellectual notions of the past. Neither is it, on the other hand, intellectual notions of the present. The essence of the Christian religion lies in its realisation of the truth that the union of the Human and the Divine is possible. It proclaims that God and Man may have communion with each other. This fact is not a theory or a speculation, but an experience that was perpetually exhibited in the soul of the Founder, and to which we are asked perpetually to

look, and which can happen in the depth of every soul. This has to be believed before any great change can come over mankind or over the affairs of the world. Mankind must perforce realise that it is missing infinitely much for its own strength, freedom, and blessedness when it misses this message of the possibility of the union of the Human and the Divine, and of the possibility of the creation of ever-new spiritual qualities within the soul. For this means nothing less than to lay hold more and more upon immortal life in the midst of the fluctuations and contradictions of the world.

Jesus answered and said unto her, Every one that drinketh of this water shall thirst again: but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall become in him a well of water springing up unto eternal life (St. John iv., 13-14).

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

IN the previous chapters the successive stages through which human personality must progress have been set forth. In this concluding chapter we shall set forth some of the most significant aspects of the conclusions we have reached. We shall likewise attempt to show that it is incumbent upon us not merely to know but also to be what is implied therein.

Knowing and being are inseparably connected. Our knowledge is meant to become intuition; our intuition, in its turn, gives us a taste of reality which cannot be obtained by knowledge alone. It is thus seen that the plea put forth in this book is theoretical and practical—it touches our intelligence and our personality. It leaves neither side

out of account, lest our whole being should suffer.

We have indicated that science gives us a view of the universe, which is far from being negative or materialistic touching man's place within the universe. There is legitimate ground for the assertion, according to the most advanced scientific thought, that Matter and Life are either two different qualities, or are two manifestations of a substance which underlies both. But however close the relation of one to the other may be, the higher—Life—cannot be reduced to the lower. This truth needs to be enforced, for in it we find a warrant for the place of Freedom in the physical universe. In other words, we see that man is not confined to the materialistic level: he is more than matter, and is able to soar to heights from which he may read the meaning of the universe, and may experience that meaning as a real element within his own personality. And such a meaning is never to cease to grow. Science, indeed, tells us

much that is of value, but it is not the final interpretation either of the universe or of human personality. But let the knowledge that there is a place for man in the world and a possibility for him to ascend, grow to conviction, and we shall view all things from an entirely different standpoint. Through this, we shall be in a position, not perhaps to obtain all that we need, yet to see that we are meant to venture towards higher altitudes of the spirit; and the warrant for this is given by the conclusions of natural science. Such conclusions will form preparatory stages for the *more* and the *greater* that are still to come when other needs and aspects of the personality unfold themselves in other directions of life.

Closely related to the subject of Matter and Life is that of Body and Mind. In Matter and Life we are dealing with what is *objective* to ourselves—with what has brought the universe into being and with what keeps it going. In dealing with Body and Mind we are dealing with ourselves.

Our own life becomes now an object of interest and investigation for us. During the past quarter of a century much has been made clear in this direction. The relations of Body and Mind have been exhibited in a clearer way than ever before: Mind is seen to be more dependent upon bodily processes than was previously suspected to be the case. The conclusions reached in this respect are full of wonder and significance. By understanding this fact, we shall understand that the bodily mechanism is capable of achievements which the most complicated machine can never perform, even though the utmost human skill has been employed upon its construction. The body is thus seen not as an enemy but as a servant of mind. Its natural life, as we already noticed, includes something more than mechanism, and even points in the direction of spirit. We must not then dare to condemn our bodies; we must rather use them for the further development of the life of the spirit. We are not to attempt to fly to higher altitudes

at the expense of the body, but to take it with us wherever we go. But the body and what appertains to it are not self-sufficing. They point towards mind as the interpreter of what they should do and how they should behave. Emphasis, then, is not only to be placed upon body but upon what is higher in the scale of being than itself—mind. And to all that mind can mean man must somehow rise. There cannot be two opinions that the need of mounting to the higher meaning of mind, the need for its unceasing ever-further development should form the urgent text of every message to the present generation.

We have to admit the wider potential range and the habitually narrow actual use. We live subject to arrest by degrees of fatigue which we have come only from habit to obey. Most of us may learn to push the barrier farther off, and to live in perfect comfort on much higher levels of power. . . . The emotions and excitements due to usual situations are the usual excitors of the will. But they act discontinuously; and in the intervals the shallower levels of

life tend to close in and shut us off. Accordingly the best practical knowers of the human soul have invented the thing known as methodical ascetic discipline to keep the deeper levels constantly in reach. Beginning with easy tasks, passing to harder ones, and exercising day by day, it is, I believe, admitted that disciples of asceticism can reach very high levels of freedom and power of will.¹

Does not this passage show to what great heights we may be raised by a full use of the mind and its faculties? All thinkers, indeed, are agreed that here lies one of the most important factors in the development of the intellectual and moral life. It is certainly not the sole factor, but its value must not be ignored. We are in duty bound to conserve and deepen the intellectual aspects of truth. For when this is done, we shall become conscious that a spiritual world is present alongside of the material one—a spiritual world that has been brought into existence by inhibiting those impulses and instincts of the body

¹ Cf. William James, *Memories and Studies*, ch. x.

which are stated by mind to be injurious either in relation to the present situation, or always. On this level of the mind, in its purely personal form, as it deals with the individual himself, much can be accomplished, and much can be attained. And our efforts and endeavours will prove of the utmost service for the higher pilgrimage which still lies in front of us.

But we recognise very early in life that we cannot live to ourselves, that we stand in relations to others. Then at a later stage we come to see that the value and significance of life consist largely in taking such relations into account and in making them a portion of our own personality. Our knowledge, however, of the actual factors which make for the development of life does not come to us of itself without any effort on our part. Hence, it becomes imperative that we should learn how to live in accordance with our social inheritance and in unison with the good relations in which we stand to our fellows. As soon as we have obtained a

firm grasp of this truth, we see that our own personal interests have rights only in so far as they take into account the interests of others. The mind now takes an *objective* standpoint; it dare no longer think only of its own ambitions and advancement. These will be the more surely realised when the meaning, value, and significance of the relations which should exist between human beings are paid their due respect. There cannot be any doubt that the only way for human society to progress is by taking into account the *ideal* of the relations between human beings. Every man has to search out for these relations, and make the ideal his own by living it. The ideal may, first of all, be discovered close at hand—in the family, and in the relation which the man happens to have with his family. But then it has to be extended to cover wider circles, such as the individual's school or college, his village or town, his church, all churches, his nation, humanity, and, finally, God. We are thus, as we have already pointed

out, in the realm of the *Ought*—of obligations which have to be fulfilled and which have to infuse the personality with their content. This is a tremendous leap from our mere personal ordinary life. And, in an all-important sense, the natural, ordinary life has to die in order that the over-individual life of the Ought may become man's possession. Indeed, it may be stated that by this means man creates a *cosmic soul* within himself. How much or how little of that soul may be present in him depends upon how much or how little of his whole mind and spirit is stirred into activity. There is no other way of reaching a spiritual existence which shall employ our every faculty. To live in such relations, to be ever trying to further them, means nothing less than to bring a spiritual world into the soul and to spread a spiritual atmosphere over the world at large.

It is possible to enjoy such an experience, and yet afterwards to sink to the dead level of ordinary life. And this danger was

pointed out in our remarks on Values. The Values which have been attained are to be nurtured, conserved, and furthered. Almost everything depends upon the attention and interest that are devoted to them. These Values are "sensitive plants": they soon wither away if care is not bestowed upon them at the beginning. But once their root has struck in the deepest soil of the personality they form a portion of the life which can never wholly perish.

We then see these Values as making out the nature of spirit. And, forming as they do realities which have grown up in the very constitution of the world of human relations, they are concluded to be beams of a still more perfect Reality that lies beyond them—God. We have tried to show in this Volume that they cannot have any other meaning. Our whole being, then, is made for God, and needs God. We must beware, however, of thinking that the Divine that is in man is anything ready-made, or anything that can be obtained

without constant struggle. And, finally, we have tried to show that the culmination of personality is found in our union with the over-individual ideals of life and with God. That, we saw, is the very message of Christianity. Its supreme expression was the life of its Founder. In that Divine life all that was found on lower levels converged. And, as rivers that are lost in the ocean do but merge with what is greater than themselves, so in the life of the Founder of Christianity the union of the Divine and the Human constitutes the final meaning of the world and the highest spiritual ascent of man.

So philosophy is more spiritual in her humility and abstinence than in her short-lived audacities, and she would do well to inscribe over her gates what, in an ancient Spanish church, may be seen near the steep entrance to a little subterranean crypt¹:

“Would'st thou pass this lowly door?
Go, and angels greet thee there;

¹ George Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 22.

For by this their sacred stair
To descend is still to soar.
Bid a measured silence keep
What thy thoughts be telling o'er;
Sink, to rise with wider sweep
To the heaven of thy rest,
For he climbs the heavens best
Who would touch the deepest deep."

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